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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has become an 
accepted tool to assess risk from different sources such as nuclear power 
plants (NPPs), dam failures, floods, earthquakes, civil aviation, regula­
tion of pesticides, coal fuel cycles, liquified natural gas, and the 
chemical industry. The PRA techniques are being used to compare and re­
duce risk from various societal activities, and to manage risk in a cost-
effective manner. Since no activity is risk free, PRA is helping to make 
a decision on acceptable risk level for the health and safety of the 
public from various man-made hazards. However, PRA is relatively a new 
field, and much development is needed in methods before realistic safety 
predictions can be made. This dissertation suggests new approaches in 
PRA in the areas of uncertainty propagation of component failure proba­
bilities, point estimates of risk qualification, and sensitivity analysis 
to delineate critical components that contribute significantly to poten­
tial risk from nuclear power plants. 
An area of utmost importance is a proper framework for making deci­
sions pertaining to NPP risk based on a multitude of available informa­
tion. Problems that require decision making in energy production in 
general, and NPPs in particular, are numerous. Some of the examples 
requiring decision analysis are: determination of acceptable risk limits 
to which the general public may be exposed from NPPs, determination of 
risk of nuclear proliferation due to various types of commercial nuclear 
power plants as compared to other routes of nuclear proliferation, and 
determination of the most desirable site (based on public risk, cost. 
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and various site characteristics) for construction of a NPP. This 
dissertation provides a framework for such decision analyses based on 
trade-offs pertaining to various competing attributes. 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
The dissertation Is arranged In five sections; each section is com­
plete in Itself and documents the study of a new topic. These sections 
are written in the form of papers; the first four papers have been pub­
lished, and the fifth one is in a form suitable for publication. The 
first two papers employ multi-attribute decision theory for nuclear power 
plant siting and proliferation Issues. The last three papers are related 
to new quantitative techniques and investigations pertaining to proba­
bilistic risk assessment. 
Section I provides a framework for making siting decisions for a 
nuclear power plant considering a multitude of competing site character­
istics such as man-made and natural hazards, economic impact, and various 
features of the land. A decision model and application for assessing 
risk of alternative proliferation routes is given in Section II, and a 
method and computer code for propagating uncertainty in PRÂ is provided 
in Section III. An Investigation on the use of point-estimate quantifi­
cation of risk associated with nuclear power plants is given in Section 
IV, and a sensitivity analysis approach for analyzing robustness of PRA 
results is provided in Section V. 
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Scope of Investigation 
The investigation pertains to various topics in decision analy­
sis and probabilistic risk assessment as it relates to Nuclear Power 
Plants. The topics of decision analysis and PRA are inherently related 
for solutions to safety problems in NFPs. Thus, the PRA methods are 
used to help in making decisions such as design modifications, changes 
in operating procedures, and relaxing or imposing regulatory require­
ments. To this end, PRA can be considered as a safety-related deci­
sion tool where the strengths and weaknesses of a complex system can 
be revealed through analytical procedures. 
However, a formal decision analysis tool can be used for more 
generic problems, where multiple, competing factors or attributes are 
involved. The formal decision analysis explicitly considers the 
preferences and trade-offs of the decision-maker for the attributes of 
interest. 
The dissertation addresses five topics related to nuclear power 
plants, all of which are directed to help either explicitly or Implicitly 
in making engineering decisions. The method of formal decision analysis, 
namely, multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), is used for problems in 
Sections I and II. The Improvements in the methods of PRA that can be 
used for making safety related decisions are provided in Sections III, 
IV and V. 
Significance of the Selected Topics 
Five topics were selected here on the basis of their significance in 
making decisions for a variety of issues related to the nuclear Industry. 
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The formal decision analysis model, namely MAUT, Is used for making 
nuclear power plant siting decisions from among three alternatives. The 
methods actually used by the utility for making the siting decision 
did not Involve formal decision analysis. However, the decisions result­
ing through formal decision analysis coincided with the ones actually 
made by the utility. The methodology for developing models for selecting 
sites Is, of course, not limited to nuclear power facilities, and can be 
extended to other energy facilities as well. Such energy facilities may 
include fossil, nuclear fusion, and solar power plants. 
The formal decision analysis was again applied to assess risk from 
alternate routes of nuclear proliferation. Various potential routes, 
including nuclear power plants such as high-temperature gas-cooled 
reactors (HTAR), pressurized water reactors (PWR), and boiling water 
reactors (BWR), were considered to evaluate the relative difficulty with 
which a terrorist group, or a nonnuclear country, could develop nuclear 
weapons. The formal decision analysis methodology again reinforces 
decisions made by the nuclear community in general, but based on other 
methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Decisions to reduce risks associated with nuclear power plants are 
being made increasingly through the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
methods. An important aspect influencing risk decisions is the uncer­
tainty in the calculated risk. Since accidents in nuclear power plants 
resulting in release of large quantities of radioactive materials have 
never occurred, and since the probability of such accidents occurring 
during the lifetimes of the nuclear power plants is very small, the 
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predicted risk Is based on many assumptions, some of them very uncertain 
In nature. To calculate the uncertainty In risk calculations, the 
uncertainties in various assumptions and events involved are propagated 
through the risk model. In Section III, the Discrete Probability 
Distribution (DFD) method is developed and compared with other techniques 
of propagating uncertainties such as the Monte-Carlo method, and propa­
gation of moments. The accuracy of the DPD method and the computation 
times are also compared and found to be favorable. The DPD method has 
the advantage that the failure probability distributions of the basic 
events can be obtained, using histograms, through the use of limited 
data and engineering judgment. The DPD method is "exact," in the sense 
that no sampling errors are involved. Further, the propagation of dis­
crete probability distributions allows us not to make assumptions regard­
ing certain types of probability distributions of the basic events 
without adequate validation. 
Another issue that often arises for the PRÀ practitioners is the 
uncertainty in decisions pertaining to nuclear power plant risk manage­
ment based on the point estimate calculations of risk. The interpreta­
tion of the point-estimate values of risk is a source of confusion, and 
is treated differently in different plant PRAs. The lack of a con­
sistent approach has yielded results for different plant PRAs which 
cannot be compared. Thus, some plant PRAs used median values for the 
failure probabilities of the basic events, and propagated them to 
evaluate a point-estimate of the top event. These point-estimates were 
then compared with the mean or median values of the top-events for other 
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plant PRAs. It Is shown In Section IV that the point-estimate of the 
top-event evaluated using median values of the basic events may deviate 
significantly from both mean and median values of the top-event. It is 
also shown that such deviations depend upon the skewness of the basic 
event probability distributions as well as the complexity of the system 
logic model. The results obtained through the use of point-estimate 
evaluation is shown to be optimistic, i.e., the system will appear to 
be better than it actually is. The interpretations of the point-
estimates of power plant risk will also greatly affect the validation 
procedures for nuclear power plant safety goals. The safety goals are 
expected to be Issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 
near future. The utilities will then have the burden of proving that 
the calculated nuclear power plant risks are within the specified 
safety goals. Â major problem in validating the conformance of a 
nuclear power plant performance to risk goals is the interpretation of 
the point-estimates, and the rationale of the comparisons of such point-
estimates to the safety goal. The work presented in Section IV will 
help in resolving this issue. 
Some of the major decisions nuclear utilities are presently facing 
pertain to risk management. That is, having obtained an overall 
knowledge of the risk for a nuclear power plant, through PRA, we need to 
find the corrective measures that will significantly reduce the risk from 
the existing level. This requires a ranking of the basic events in 
order of their contributions to the overall plant risk (or top-event). 
A major problem is the uncertainty associated with such a ranking due 
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to uncertainties in the probabilities of the basic events. The top 
event risk is very sensitive to the failure probability distributions 
of some of the basic events. The uncertainties in the basic event 
probability distributions are large because of the lack of sufficient 
data. Thus, a method must be devised to rank the basic events that 
account for the associated uncertainties. Further, it is highly desir­
able that such a ranking be robust, i.e., the ranking should not change 
significantly with assumptions pertaining to the basic event failure 
characteristics. This problem is addressed in Section V, where a 
sensitivity analysis approach is developed for measuring the ranking of 
the basic events in the face of data uncertainty. 
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I. A FORMAL METHODOLOGY FOR ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS 
OF ALTERNATE SITES FOR NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS 
9 
A formal methodology for acceptability analysis of 
alternate sites for nuclear power stations 
Shahld Ahmed 
A. A. Husselny 
Hang Youn Cho 
From the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames, 
lA, 50011, USA 
Published in Nuclear Engineering and Design 51(1979): 361-388 
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ABSTRACT 
A formal methodology Is developed for the selection of the best 
sites from among alternate suitable sites for a nuclear power station. 
The method Is based on reducing the various variables affecting the 
decision to a single function that provides a metric for the level of 
site acceptability. The function accommodates well-known site 
selection criteria as well as other factors, such as public reactions 
to certain choices. The method is applied to the selection of a site 
from three acceptable alternate sites for Wolf Creek nuclear power 
station, Kansas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Siting of nuclear power plants requires extensive evaluation of 
various characteristics of local areas under consideration. Also, 
several socio-economical and political factors do, in the final analysis, 
enter into the decision process. In the presence of more than one suit­
able site for a plant, a trade-off is usually to be made between the 
myriad of factors affecting the choice. 
The multidimensionality of the siting criteria makes the selection 
among alternatives a rather complex problem. Thus, decisions may be 
made on the basis of Intuition or qualitative but rather Incomplete 
assessment of the situation. Whenever quantitative analysis is empha­
sized, usually one of the multitude of factors affecting site selection 
is considered; for example, economics [1] or radioactive release to the 
public [2, 3]. In these cases, the margin of choice is narrowed by the 
fact that all appropriate sites have to meet siting regulations regard­
ing public risk while factors that might vary with site, such as land 
cost, is often irrelevant to the selection. 
Here, the multidimensionality of the site selection criteria is 
reduced to a univariate acceptability function through the use of inte­
grated weights and multivariate decision theory. The utility of lottery 
wins and losses is paralleled in the present context by the construct 
of quantitative site acceptabilities which are functions of site 
characteristics. Comparison between alternate sites in this case is 
done by deciding on the option which has the maximum acceptability. The 
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approach Is versatile enough to accommodate for public attitude, politi­
cal factors, impact on wildlife and the nonexpert opinion of action (or 
citizen) groups. Also, the decision makers can incorporate expert 
evaluation of certain aspects of the siting problem in the selection 
strategy for possible technical limitations within the utility company. 
Overall, the methodology presented here is systematic and self-
consistent and its viability is demonstrated through practical applica­
tions to a case study. 
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QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
Incorporation of the role of various decision-making and public 
groups In the site selection process was viewed upon from a pure manage­
ment and social perception by Gros et al. [4]. The deployment of a 1000 
MWe base-load unit on the New England coast was studied using a Paretlan 
environmental approach. Specifically, the benefits and costs accruing 
to four separate groups are examined; namely, environmentalists, utility 
companies, regulatory agencies, and local groups. Consulting with 
Individuals with a preference or utility functions for each of those 
were assessed over four proxy attributes: monetary costs, population 
within 15 miles of the site, temperature of water release after cool­
ing, and capacity of the site measured in a number of 1000 MWe units. 
It can, however, be argued that only considering four attributes is far 
from sufficient to take into account the full dimensionality of the 
site selection among various alternatives. Also, if a large number of 
attributes are considered, the verification of the assumptions on which 
the Paretlan model is based would become extremely difficult. If not 
impossible, since the number of restrictions on the model increases 
linearly with the number of attributes and over the number of separate 
groups considered. This is a useful preliminary work, but further 
analysis is required before it can be proven viable for the involved 
process of nuclear power plant siting. 
Keeney and Nalr [5] have also addressed the nuclear power plant sit­
ing problem in the perspective of multlattribute utility theory. The 
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complexities encountered In siting decisions are identified with a 
theoretical exposition of the theory. The applicability of the approach 
is not given in true relationship to the nuclear power plant siting. 
Since the suggested approach has not been, applied to a real situation, 
no mention is given as to how the large number of siting attributes 
would be handled, particularly since with the increase of the number of 
siting attributes the basic assumptions of the theory used can no longer 
be verified. 
Hassan [6] has used a grading scale having a range from 1 to 5, 
which gives the relative importance of each site for a particular factor 
considered. Each factor is divided into subfactors which are further 
weighted on a scale from 0 to 10 to show their relative Importance. A 
simple addition of the product of grade and weight is made for each 
alternative. The site with the highest product is the optimal choice. 
This approach is, in fact, equivalent to the multiconsequence risk in­
difference In utility theory [4]. The approach is limited and the multi-
consequence risk aversion and multi-consequence risk seeking are 
altogether neglected. 
Other quantitative methods of ranking selection criterion have been 
proposed [7-10]. The approach tends to overlook the technical details 
of each criterion and assigns a single weight which if in error would 
lead to cumulative gross errors in the final result. Although Hassan 
[6] has considered the various facets of each criterion through ranking 
of its subfactors, the weights assigned do not discriminate between the 
importance of different subfactors due to the large number of parameters 
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Involved In the analysis. The method could have been refined by analyz­
ing the subfactors involved In each criterion separately with no regard 
to other considerations and then seeking a method for combining the 
Intra-crlterla weighting factors. 
Since ranking methods may not resolve the conflicts between tech­
nologists and environmentalists, Fischer and Ahmed [11] used the Delphi 
method as a means to reconcile differences In opinion among concerned 
groups. An Impact quotient Is used to correlate between environmental 
quality with and without the plant through Importance factors for each 
factor considered. To rank the sites in the order of increasing environ­
mental costs, the additive utility is used to reflect the desirability 
of a particular alternative. However, additive utility fails short of 
accounting for risk aversion as well as risk seeking. 
Beer [7] also suggested an "impact analysis matrix" which permits 
evaluation of interactions between proposed actions which may cause 
environmental Impact and existing characteristics and conditions of the 
environment. This could give an overall subjective feeling about the 
Impact of the power plant construction but does not indicate a quanti­
tative approach towards decision on site selection among various 
alternatives. 
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SELECTION PRINCIPLES 
It Is logical to assume that the obvious and choice sites for 
nuclear power plants will be gradually consumed and future plants will 
have to be located on much more environmentally constrictive sites. 
Also, choice of alternatives will become more complex as the siting 
concepts advance as, for example, the case with offshore plants xAich 
are already a reality. Furthermore, future siting of nuclear plants is 
apt to face more stringent government (State and Federal) regulations. 
The reaction of citizen groups, environmentalists and the like to tech­
nological expansion may become severe and may lead to the development of 
sophisticated organizations that take part in decision making. Thus, if 
the utilities are to avoid financially costly delays in approval of a 
site or the utlimate rejection of the proposed site, the future site 
evaluation and selection must be done using a rational and systematic 
method of evaluation. 
Fundamental to the selection process is the basic premise that there 
is no ideal site available. Perhaps a site that is suitable to a strict 
conservationist is unsuitable to a utility company if site characteristics 
appear to impose intolerable economic costs or requisite an engineering 
solution which is not practicable. Values of land and land reclamation 
for multipurpose utilization are different in the eyes of various 
"beholders." Therefore, the objectives of the site selection program 
and the method of evaluation of alternative sites must be well-planned 
prior to initiation of the program. A site selection program is 
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successful If It provides adequate data on several alternative sites, 
tabulates these data in a logical order of Importance and ranks sites 
on the basis of suitability under different design alternatives at 
each site. It is also important in site analysis as well as in conduct­
ing the selection decision to deal with the problem as a whole rather 
than complete devotion to a single criterion. 
The following steps are recommended in the process of site selec­
tion. 
1. At the onset; all areas that have no apparent potential for 
power plants be eliminated from consideration; for example, restricted 
areas such as cities and other densely populated areas, national parks, 
and areas where adequate water is considered highly impractical to 
develop. 
i 
2. The remaining potential sites should then be studied for 
further definition of siting possibilities employing the most critical 
or limiting criteria which, if could not be met individually, should 
cause rejection of a part or all of an individual site. 
3. Specific sites should then be identified within the areas 
remaining after step 2 is completed. All site developmental and en­
vironmental criteria as well as other relevant restrictions should be 
employed as applicable in testing the suitability of sites at this stage. 
4. By reducing the number of options at step 3, a qualitative 
comparison may be conducted. All characteristics common to the final 
group of alternative sites may not be considered any further and only 
those factors for which the level of acceptance differs among the group 
18 
should be considered for more analysis. 
5. The methodology described here may then be used to decide among 
various specific sites as Identified In step 3. The decision Is arrived 
at by using acceptability functions which would be considered as a 
measure of importance of the attributes. 
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SITING MODEL 
modelling the power plant siting decision process, the analyst 
must t»btain an objective function including the multiple attributes 
whlcls. describe the effectiveness of a decision. Such an objective 
funct would indicate the relative ranking of consequences and 
iderxt: fy the trade-offs among various levels of different attributes. 
In a. -atrisk-free environment, the optimal decision would be the one that 
maxjlmd_2:es the objective function. 
Sut the power plant siting decision problem can Involve uncertain­
ties — For Instance, the regulatory process which governs such decisions 
may ct&ange in some unpredictable fashion. This type of uncertainty 
shovB.3-d. be considered in the modelling effort and the objective function 
shou3.<3. allow the uncertainty to be handled easily. One approach is to 
desan objective function such that the decision which maximizes the 
expec=.-^ ed value of the objective function is the optimal decision. Such 
an ot» -J ective function is the acceptability function used here to give a 
mea-suure of the effectiveness of given site characteristics in meeting 
the criterion relevant to that site characteristics. 
There are several ways of synthesizing acceptability functions. A 
dlrec^ t approach would have the assessor to consider this multidimensional 
probas a whole, assessing preferences for sets of attributes in the 
sevearaJL years. This is an enormous time-consuming process, with no 
guaraz&tee of consistency, since people have trouble visualizing trade­
offs in more than one dimension. In order to have the assessment made in 
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less time, the problem should be broken down into its simpler components 
and then reconstructed. 
By assessing various trade-offs between specific quantities or 
qualities, the decision analyst can find an acceptability function that 
can serve as a guide in decision making. If the consequences chosen 
satisfy certain independence properties, the assessment problem is 
simplified. The two independence properties to be considered are 
preferential independence of attributes and acceptability independences. 
Site Characteristics 
Here, site characteristics refer to those attributes which meet the 
siting criteria within an acceptable range in addition to the well-known 
criteria which have been stated in the regulatory guides [12] and dis­
cussed in several places [13]. Several other factors are considered 
explicitly here; such as ease of construction, domestic water, and 
ecology. Public acceptance plays a major role in licensing. In many 
situations, this factor is considered as part of environmental, ecologi­
cal or social impacts. However, resistance to siting of power plants in 
general and nuclear plants in particular in many locations has been a 
result of psychological discomfort and/or reluctance of small communi­
ties to social disturbances due to the influx of construction workers. 
Objection to extending transmission lines through the fields or to ris­
ing electric power cost have been reflected in the public attitude to­
wards the activities of the utility companies. 
The major site characteristics considered here are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Site characteristics and selection criteria 
Indifference Scaling 
No. Characteristics probability factors 
(1) (Y^ ) (P,) (k^ ) 
1 Cooling water 0.083 -0.99 
2 Soil 0.069 -0.894 
3 Construction 0.059 —0.69 
4 Services 0.054 -0.99 
5 Domestic water 0.047 -0.933 
6 Accessibility 0.056 -0.998 
7 Compatibility of land use 0.049 -0.842 
8 Ecology 0.064 -0.926 
9 Demography 0.069 -0.978 
10 Topography 0.058 -0.54 
11 Geology 0.073 -0.927 
12 Aircraft hazard 0.046 -0.856 
13 Man-made hazard 0.048 -0.949 
14 Natural phenomena 0.052 -0.998 
15 Meteorology 0.046 -0.981 
16 Public acceptance 0.056 -0.92 
17 Economic Impact 0.069 -0.962 
The list Is by no means exclusive and usually additional factors may be 
added whenever an Issue of new concern arises. Some of the characteris­
tics listed In Table 1 have been given more general names to Include 
the more specific measures as sub-factors or sub-attributes, such as 
seismology, hydrology, aquatic biology, and terrestrial biology. 
Since the characteristics Y^ , Yg, ... Y^ y represent a set {y^ },l = 
1, 2, ..., 17 of parameters which measure the achievement of the siting 
objective, then 
Y « ••• **17 (1) 
may be Identified as a 17-consequence space which Includes all possible 
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values of with y^  being a specific outcome of y^ , 1=1, 2» ...» 17. 
Actually, any member may have more than outcome y^ ,^ j=l, 2 m 
which is the case if several sites are being considered. If, for 
exanqile, the decision is made on the selection of a site from among 
three suitable sites, then 
\ = (fil' ^12» fis) » (2) 
when subscripts 1, 2 and 3 refer to the number designated to the site 
in question. 
Site Acceptability Functions 
For an outcome y^  of a characteristic one can define an accepta­
bility function, U^ (y^ ) which reflects the desirability level of having 
an outcome y^  for the characteristic Y^ . This function is obtained from 
detailed analysis of the factors affecting the value of the outcome y^  
which assumes a value between the least desirable level y^  ^and the most 
desirable level y*. The acceptability function may be normalized to 
unity such that 
U(yJ) = 1 
and 
U(y^ *) = 0 . (3) 
Although the acceptability U(y^ ) of an outcome y^  may be discrete, it 
is assumed here that all acceptability functions are continuous and are 
bounded by the values given in equation 3. 
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We may also define the outcome y^ _ of the complement Y^ _ of the 
characteristic as the 17-consequence space that includes all char­
acteristics except the ith characteristic, that is 
y^  ^= (y^ , yg, •••, y^  •••» • (4) 
Similarly, the complement of two characteristics Y^  and Y^  can be 
written as 
yij_ » y^ xyz^  ... x ... xyj_^ x^yj_^ ^^ x ... xy^ ,^ 
(5) 
where Y. is a member of Y. and y.. is a member of Y.. . i- 1- ij- ij-
Supra-acceptability Function 
If N sites are considered, then for each alternate site S^ , 
n = 1, 2, ..., N one may define a supra-acceptabillty function y, which 
combines the sum of all the acceptability functions corresponding to the 
consequences or outcomes of all the 17 characteristics weighted by an 
indifference probability P^ , 1= 1, 2 17; namely 
17 
P = Z P.U (y ) , (6) 
1=1  ^^  1 
where 
17 
i p, = 1 , (7) 
1=1 ^ 
that is, if = U^ (y*) = 1, then y = 1. 
The siting model gives an indifference probability distribution 
ïï(P^ ) representing which outcome may occur and the associated likeli­
hood. Values of P^  will be defined and determined below. 
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The supra-acceptablllty function of the form given In equation 6 
Is In fact a best estimate of acceptance level when the decision makers 
are only Interested In the equivalent quantitative value estimate of 
the level; that Is, they are Indifferent to risk and neither liberal 
risk seeking nor highly risk averse. In other situations, such as 
those presented below, a risk aversion preference may be followed. 
The physical Interpretation of the three distinct attitudes towards 
risk In decision making may be Interpreted through consideration of two 
alternative lotteries A and B. 
In lottery A, Figure 1, the outcomes of the 17 characteristics in 
the consequence space are determined by 17 two-pronged lotteries, each 
giving a probability at the best level and a probability level 
(1 - P^ ) at the worst level. 
In lottery B, represented in Figure 2, the outcome values of the 
17 characteristics in the consequence space for siting are determined 
by a single-pronged lottery, with a probability P^  of getting the best 
level for each consequence and a probability (1 - F^ ) of getting the 
worst level for each consequence. 
Lottery A would be preferred to lottery B if the site selection 
preference for the assessor is to have a combination of best and worst 
characteristic values rather than all best or all worst characteristics. 
This represents a multivariate risk aversion. Multi-consequence risk 
indifference means the decision maker has no preference for either 
lottery, while a preference for lottery B over lottery A represents 
the liberal multi-consequence risk seeking. 
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Figure 1. Lottery A 
(yf' H v 
y j * . v '  
Figure 2. Lottery B 
26 
To Illustrate the technique for assessing the Indifference proba­
bility cooling water characteristic may be taken as an example. 
A certain consequence with cooling water supply at Its most acceptable 
level, and all the other 16 characteristics at their least acceptable 
level may be compared to a lottery yielding the consequence with all the 
17 characteristics at their most acceptable level with probability 
or the consequence with all the 17 characteristics least acceptable with 
probability (1 - P^ ). The object Is to find a value of P^  such that the 
decision maker Is Indifferent between the lottery and the certain 
consequence. This utilizes the Indifference probability procedure [13] 
which can be expressed, In general, as follows: 
+ (1 - (8) 
where ~ refers to Indifference between both sides of the relationship. 
The decision point Is shown In Figure 3. From equations 3, 6 and 7: 
"(y^ , yi_*) " pf • (9) 
Actually, the evaluation of a point of the most probable value of P^  
depends on the acceptability pattern of the decision makers subject to 
regulation constraints. 
The Delphi 
To reconcile the differences among various experts regarding values 
of the Indifference probabilities P^ , a Delphi questionnaire method is 
used. The Delphi method is an Iterative questioning and answering 
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Figure 3. Lottery to find the difference probability for the 
characteristics 
procedure. The basic characteristics of the method are anonymity, 
feedback; and statistical response. A total of ten questionnaires have 
been distributed to a group of well-informed persons of different back­
ground and experience In the nuclear energy field. The results have 
shown a considerable degree of homogeneity In spite of the diversity 
between those who have responded. The final values of which resulted 
from the Delphi analysis are contained in Table 1. A sample of the 
questionnaire is given in the Appendix. 
Site Intra-characterlstlcs 
Each characteristic in the 17-consequences space comprises a subset 
of intra-characterlstlcs, that is: 
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\ ' J = 1, 2, ...» , (10) 
where j Is the Index of the Jth Intra-characteristic in the ith 
set and is the total number of intra-characteristics within that 
set. A list of the intra-characteristics is given in Table 2 with 
corresponding measures and extreme values of the outcome x^  of X^ ,^ 
j = 1, 2, .J^ ; namely, the best consequence x*j and the worse x^ j*. 
Many of the intra-characteristics listed have been assigned a sub­
jective metric; nevertheless, appropriate units may be used when standards 
are set for each of those factors. An expert judgment is then required 
for such items from specialists in evaluating each site characteristic. . 
The expert values can be alternatively transformed to subjective units. 
However, use of appropriate units would be more relevant since the 
transformation from characteristics to acceptability functions will 
remove the inconsistency among the selected measures. 
Inter-acceptability Functions 
For each intra-characteristic X^ j in the J-consequence space repre­
senting the characteristic set {Y^ }, an inter-acceptability function 
Uj^ j (Xj) may be defined, such that 
and 
uy<xjj) = 1 
"lj(*ij*) ® for any j from 1 to . (11) 
These functions can be combined with appropriate integrated weight 
and indifference probabilities p^  to give the acceptability of the 
Table 2. Site intra-characteristics and acceptability bounds 
No. Character-
(i) istic (V 
Index Intra-characteristic 
(j) (Xy) 
Measure 
Acceptability bounds 
Indif­
ference 
proba-
Best Worst bility 
(^ i^ ) 
1 Cooling water 1 sources 
2 availability 
3 distance 
4 purity 
5 incremental water temperature at 
peak ambient water temperature 
period of the year 
ft^ /s(average) 
average/max. 
flow rate 
mile 
subjective 
°F 
20,000 
1 
0 
100 
0 
1,000 
0 
0.723 
0.761 
4 0.615 
0 0.5 
5 0.554 
2 Soil 1 classification subjective 100 0 0.368 
2 characteristics subjective 100 0 0.355 
3 properties subjective 100 0 0.35 
4 bearing capacity subjective 100 0 0.391 
5 fixation of radwaste subjective 100 0 0.295 
6 ground water depth subjective 100 0 0.608 
3 Construction 1 land preparation subjective 100 0 0.608 
2 labor $/h 0 25 0.675 
4 Services 1 electricity subjective 100 0 0.71 
2 gas subjective 100 0 0.40 
3 drainage and sewage subjective 100 0 0.582 
4 location of services subjective 100 0 0.573 
5 capacities subjective 100 0 0.664 
6 distribution lines subjective 100 0 0.727 
5 Domestic water 1 availability subjective 100 0 0.636 
2 characteristics subjective 100 0 0.636 
3 size, depth and pressure of mains subjective 100 0 0.555 
Table 2. Continued 
No. Character-
(i) istlc 
"i> 
Index 
(j) 
Intra-characteristic 
(Xy) 
Measure 
Acceptability bounds 
Indif­
ference 
proba-
Best Worst bilit; 
(K*^ ) (Xii*) (Pii) 
4 consumption subjective 100 0 0.536 
5 distribution systems subjective 100 0 0.518 
6 sources and location subjective 100 0 0.527 
6 Accessibility 1 land characteristics along route subjective 100 0 0.67 
of transmission line network 
2 distance to transmission line mile 0 50 0.77 
intensities and substation 
3 highway subjective 100 0 0.73 
4 railroad subjective 100 0 0.79 
5 waterways subjective 100 0 0.75 
7 Land use 1 agriculture subjective 100 0 0.348 
2 special land use (parks, wildlife. subjective 100 0 0.305 
refuge, etc.) 
3 residential characteristic subjective 100 0 0.309 
4 public facilities subjective 100 0 0.295 
5 sensitive industries (oil and subjective 100 0 0.314 
gas pipe lines) 
6 weapons testing subjective 100 0 0.314 
8 Ecology 1 river or lake classification subjective 100 0 0.71 
(irrigation, fishing, recreation. 
wild, etc.) 
2 endangered species subjective 100 0 0.52 
3 biological conditions subjective 100 0 0.63 
9 Demography 1 existing population within 1 mile persons 0 10,000 0.654 
Tablë 2. Continued 
No. Character- Index Zntra-characteristlc 
(i) istic (j) (Xjj) 
(yj) 
10 Topography 
11 Geology 
12 Aircraft impact 1 
2 
3 
13 Man-made 
hazards 
14 Natural 
phenomena 
2 expected population within 1 mile, 
year 2000 
3 existing population within 20 miles 
4 estimated population within 20 miles 
5 proximity to nearest population 
center 
1 number of potential sites per region 
2 terrain for power plant 
1 mine hazard 
2 oil hazard 
3 seismology 
4 tectonic (geology dealing with, 
faulting and folding) 
proximity to airport 
bombing ranges 
low level training routes 
1 ship collision and explosion 
2 flammable gas and vapor clouds 
3 toxic chemicals 
4 fire 
1 tornadoes 
2 high water (HW) level floods 
3 HW from dam failure 
4 HW from hurricanes 
Measure 
Acceptability bounds 
Indif­
ference 
proba­
bility 
(p44) 
Best 
( x * )  
Worst 
persons 0 10,000 0.569 
million persons 0 7 0.477 
million persons 0 15 0.407 
miles 50 0 0.585 
sites/region 5 0 0.583 
subjective 100 0 0.608 
subjective 100 0 0.423 
subjective 100 0 0.407 
subjective 0 100 0.631 
subjective 0 100 0.577 
miles 10 0 0.522 
miles 100 0 0.607 
miles 100 0 0.528 
subjective 0 100 0.575 
subjective 0 100 0.575 
subjective 0 100 0.525 
subjective 0 100 0.592 
subjective 0 100 0.52 
foot 0 100 0.73 
foot 0 100 0.75 
foot 0 100 0.70 
Table 2. Continued 
No. Character- Index Intra-characterlstlc 
(1) Istlc (j) (X.J 
(yj) 
15 Meteorology 
16 Public 
acceptance 
5 HW from tsunamles 
6 HW from seiches 
7 low water 
1 sustained wind velocity 
2 diffusion (stability category) 
3 inversion temperature 
3 
4 
17 Economic impact 1 
2 
3 
[14] 
occupational group (unions, 
merchants, corporations) 
citizen group (civic associations, 
environmentalists, etc.) 
media 
state laws 
cost of cooling water supply related 
to the water intakes, pipelines, 
storage or water supply reservoirs 
and pumping facilities required to 
deliver a reliable supply of water 
to a plant at each identified site 
land acquisition costs 
site preparation costs, such as 
clearing, grading, flood protection 
and waterproofing, on-site access im 
provements and relocated road and 
bridge construction costs 
Acceptability bounds 
Indif-
Measure ference 
proba-
Best Worst bility 
(x*J (x_*) (P,,) 
foot 0 100 0.62 
foot 0 100 0.52 
foot 0 100 0.43 
mph 20 0 0.73 
A to 6 G A 0.78 
°C/100 m 2 -1.5 0.73 
subjective 100 0 0.5 
subjective 100 0 0.436 
subjective 100 0 0.45 
subjective 100 0 0.628 
M$ 0 14 0.64 
$/acre 
M$ 
0 10,000 
0 8 
0.5 
0.55 
Table 2. Continued 
Acceptability bounds 
Indif­
No. Character­ Index Intra-characterlstlc Measure ference 
(1) istic (j) <Xy) proba-
(Y.) Best Worst blllty 1 
4 foundation cost estimates such as M$ 0 20 0.61 
cost of dewaterlng special founda­
tion treatment excavation, founda­
tion base, mats, pile foundation 
If required, and backfilling 
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corresponding outcome of Y^ , that Is 
where p^  ^Is to be evaluated In a fashion similar to that used In 
determining the Indifference probabilities F^ . The lottery used Is 
shown In Figure 4, which can be represented by 
*^lj * ~ l^j^ *lj^  + (1 - (13) 
and therefore 
u(y^ (xjj. xij_*)) = pij (14) 
from equations 6 and 11. Here, represent the complement of in 
the sense described above for y^ . The results have been obtained 
Figure 4. Lottery to determine the difference probability p^  for the 
Intra-characteristlcs 
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using the Delphi approach and are listed In Table 2. 
In reaching equation 12, the underlying assumption is that the 
decision maker is not indifferent to risk [15]. More specifically, a 
conservative risk aversion approach is used in obtaining the inter-
acceptability functions or levels corresponding to intra-characteristic 
. This is due to the fact that the intra-characteristics must pass 
a stringent scrutiny based on measurements and analysis in order to 
pass the acceptance test. Once this is done properly, the need for 
further conservation in evaluating the site supra-acceptability from 
the more general characteristics can be disposed of and hence the 
multi-consequence risk function of equation 6 can be used. 
For risk aversion, the following relationships [16] define the 
value of Pj and k of equation 12, 
•'if 
and 
0 < py < 1 
-1 < k^  < 0 . (15) 
The scaling factors k^  are obtained from equation 12 by setting the out­
comes intra-characteristics at their best consequence level; that is, 
ji 
1 = + vij^  ' (16) 
the numerical values are then obtained by iteration of the roots of 
this Ji-order equation and the root that satisfies equation 15 is 
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selected. The results are given In Table 1. 
Equation 12 may be substituted into equation 6 to directly give 
the supra-acceptabillty function for site namely 
*^ 1 *ipij"ij(*ij)] " (17) 
Once the acceptability functions are evaluated at can be 
determined and the site to be selected is the one with the maximum 
supra-acceptabillty that is 
p. = max {y, }. (18) 
pi'ki'plj 
Validity of Acceptability and Characteristic Relationships 
The multi-attribute utility theory reduces to simplistic functional 
form of representing the acceptability function under certain basic 
conditions [17-22]. The acceptability concept is theoretically sound, 
and the mathematical details are not involved. However, the difficulty 
comes when one tries to specify reasonable procedures for obtaining 
multi-attributed acceptability functions. In a real problem like 
ours, if the assumptions are verified, the functional form can be used 
to simplify the requisite assessments needed to specify the accepta­
bility function. 
The main assumptions used concern the concept of preferential 
independence and acceptability independence. The consequence pair 
X is said to be preferentially independent of its complement 
X^ jg^ _ If one's preference order for consequences (x^ j, x^ ,^ 
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with held fixed, does not depend on the fixed amount 
For example, consider the cooling water characteristic Y^ . One 
needs to verify whether the flow rate of the water source (X^ )^ and the 
distance of water source (X^ g) are preferentially Independent of other 
Intra-characterlstlcs In Y^ , that Is, 1^4 ^ d^ X^ g. To do so, one 
3 
starts by determining the flow rate x^  ^ft /s of a water source subject 
to the condition that 
(x^ i ft^ /s; 3 miles) - (3000 ft^ /s; 2 miles) . (19) 
3  That Is, a water source of flow rate, x^  ^ft /s at a distance of 3 
3  
miles is indifferent to a water source of flow rate 3000 ft /s at a 
3 distance of 2 miles. A figure of x^  ^= 5000 ft /s may be obtained. 
However, the exact number is not important for verifying the assumptions, 
since the interest is in knowing if this number changes when other 
attributes are varied. Thus, the other attributes may be varied to any 
desirable magnitude and then x^  ^is re-evaluated using equation 19. 
The result remains the same regardless of the changes. In fact, the 
value of x^  ^is invariant for any trade-offs between water source and 
its distance from the power plant. Hence, it is concluded that water 
source and the distance are preferentially independent. 
Other intra-characterlstlcs in the 5-consequence space {Y^ } are 
examined for independence. The availability (X^ g) and incremental 
water temperature (X^ g) are found to be preferentially Independent. 
In fact, going through a number of combinations, we find that all intra-
characterlstlcs are preferentially independent of the remaining set of 
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Intra-characterlstlcs In the J-consequence space for all Y^ s. Similar­
ly, the preferential Independence for the characteristics In the 17-
consequence space {Y^ } are verified. 
On the other hand, the conditions for acceptability Independence 
depend upon the decision maker's preferences for lotteries Involving 
uncertainty. One says that X^ j, for example. Is Inter-acceptablllty 
Independent of If one's preference order over lotteries on X^ j, 
represented as (x^ j, x^ j_) with X^ _^ held fixed, does not depend on 
the fixed amount Here again, the same approach Is applicable. 
Let us see, for example. If the Incremental water temperature (*C), X^  ^
Is acceptability Independent of X^ g_. The other 4 Intra-characterlstlcs 
are set at reasonable magnitudes, and the conditional Inter-acceptablllty 
function over X^ g from 0°C to 5°C Is assessed. It Is found that 3.4°C 
was Indifferent to a 50-50 lottery yielding either 0°C to 5*C. Then 
the values of the X^ g_ Intra-characterlstlcs are changed to less 
desirable magnitudes. Again, It Is found that 3.4°C Is Indifferent to a 
50-50 lottery yielding either 0°C to 5°C. This Is verified for any 
fixed value of X^ g_. Thus, It Is found that relative preference for any 
lotteries and consequences Involving uncertainties only about X^ g would 
not depend on the other Intra-characterlstlcs of Y^ . The conclusion Is, 
therefore, that X^ g Is Inter-acceptablllty Independent of the other four 
Intra-characterlstlcs. By going through Identical procedures. It Is 
verified that all the remaining intra-characterlstlcs are also inter-
acceptablllty Independent. Similarly, the acceptability Independence 
for the characteristics set {Y^ } is verified. 
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Evaluation of Inter-acceptability Patterns 
The single - c o nsequence inter-acceptability function u^ )^ can 
be obtained by the technique demonstrated in the following example: 
let us take the intra-characteristic incremental water temperature, 
and determine the feasible range of values of x^  ^from the most pre­
ferred value to the least preferred value. Scaling the inter-
acceptability function from zero to one, as in equation 11, u^  ^(0°C) = 1 
and u^  ^(5*C) = 0. Next, consider the lottery with a probability of 
0.5 of obtaining x^ g and a probability of 0.5 of obtaining x^ g*. Find 
a value x^  ^such that the decision maker is indifferent to a choice 
between the lottery and the certain consequence: 
Then, the inter-acceptability corresponding to the point in the 
intra-characteristic range from 0°C to 5°C is: 
{X15} - 0.5{x*g} + 0.5{x^ g*} (20) 
(21) 
A value of x^ g^ = 3.4®C is found; hence 
Ui5(3.4°C) = 0.5 . (22) 
Repeating the process for the following lotteries: 
{4.3°C} - 0.5{Xig} + 0.5{Xi5*} (23) 
and 
{2.2'C} - 0.5{X^ 3} + O.SixJg} (24) 
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whence 
and 
Uig(4.3*C) = 0.25 
uigcz.z'c) = 0.75 . 
(25) 
(26) 
Other points can be obtained to define the Inter-acceptablllty pattern, 
"15^ *15)' process Is repeated for all the Intra-characterlstlcs 
over the 17 siting consequence space. The resulting patterns are 
plotted in Figures 5 through 19. Each pattern may be fitted to a 
smooth curve of the form 
uy(xy) = oy + 6^  
1 = 1, 2 ... 17 and j = 1, 2 ... J 
1 ' (27) 
where 8^ ,^ and are the inter-acceptablllty shape factors. The 
resulting equations for all the intra-characterlstlcs are. 
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Figure 15. Inter-acceptablllty of Intra-characterlstlcs of 
geology, meteorology, man-made hazards, and public 
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*45 
*46 
(31) 
50 
-0.225 
"52 -0.225 
"53 1.067 + 
"54 1.125 
"55 1.408 
"56 -0.408 
0.225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1.067 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.125 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1.408 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0408 
exp 
0.0169 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0169 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.0277 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0219 
0 
0 
"61 -1.125 
"62 0.225 
"63 0.225 + 
"64 0.225 
"65. 0.8 
X exp 
u 71 
'72 
*73 
*74 
'75 
L"76J 
-0.0219 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.225 
0.8 
0.225 
-1.408 
0.225 
0.125 
-1.125 0 0 
0 1.225 0 
0 0 0.225 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-0.0339 0 0 
0 0.0169 0 
0 0 0.0169 
0 0 0 
1.225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.255 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.0124 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0124 
0 
0 
0 
X 51 
'52 
y 3 
'54 
'55 
'56 
0.225 0 
0 0.225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0081 
6^1 
'62 
'63 
'64 
'65 
0 
0 
0 
—0.408 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.125 
(32) 
(33) 
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exp -
0.0169 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0081 
0 
0 
0 
0 
"8l" 1.563 
"82 
s  1.563 — 
"83 1.253 
0 
0 
0.0169 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.0124 
0 
0 
1.563 0 0 
0 0.563 0 
0 0 0.253 
exp 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0169 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0219 
'71 
hi 
'73 
^74 
'75 
'76 
. (34) 
-0.0102 0 0 
0 0.0102 0 
0 0 0.016 
'81 
'82 
'83 
(35) 
"91 0.361 
"92 0.527 
"93 
= - 0.259 
"94 0.056 
"95 0.125 
1.361 0 0 
0 1.527 0 
0 0 1.259 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.056 0 
0 1.125 
X exp -
0.000133 0 0 
0 0.000106 0 
0 0 0.1977 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0.01837 0 
0 0.0439 
"101 0.5625 0.5625 0 
"102 0.253 
x  0 1.253 exp 
0.2554 
-0.016 
"91 
«92 
'93 
'94 
«95 
"101 
'l02 
(36) 
(37) 
~1.253 
"112 
"113 
= 
1.125 
-0.125 + 
"114 -0.125 
-0.253 0 0 0 
0 -0.125 0 0 
0 0 1.125 0 
0 0 0 1.125 
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X exp 
0.016 0 
0 0.0219 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
•0.0219 0 
0 0.0219 
"l21 Ô.0864 
"l22 0.9339 + 
"123. 0.3612 
0.0864 0 .. 0 
0 0.9339 0 
0 0 2.3621 
exp 
*111 
1^12 
*113 
'll4 
0.2531 0 0 
0 0.0073 0 
0 0 0.0133 
(38) 
x  121 
*122 
*123 
, (39) 
"l31 ~0.1782~ 1.1782 0 0 0 
"l32 -1.038 0 -0.038 0 0 
"l33 0.178 
+ 0 0 1.178 0 
"134. 0.125 0 0 0 1.125 
exp -
0.0189 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.0332 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0189 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0219 
"l41 0.125 
"l42 0.253 
"l43 0.076 
"Ï44 a: — 0.125 
"l45 0.125 
"146 0.141 
"147 jrl.178 
0.0219 
X exp -
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.016 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.125 0 0 
0 1.253 0 
0 0 1.076 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0.0265 0 0 
0 0.0219 0 
0 0 0.0219 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
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*132 
*133 
*134 
0 
0 
0 
1.125 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(40) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.125 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0209 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.0189 
1.141 0 
0 -0.178 
x  
*141 
*142 
*143 
*144 
*145 
*146 
*147 
(41) 
53 
r-i3ii Ô.2529 
"Ï52 ga— 0.0864 + 
"153 0.125 
pieil Ô.125" 
"l62 0.3793 
"163 0.5625 
+ 
"l64 0.3018 
0.2529 0 0 
0 0.0864 0 
0 0 1.125 
0.125 0 
0 0.3793 
exp 
0.08 0 0 
0 0.0253 0 
0 . 0 -0.0119 
151 
*152 
*153 
. (42) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
exp 
"171 0. 178 
"l72 0. 125 
"Ï73 0. 178 
"l74 0. 125 
0.02197 0 0 
0 0.0129 0 
0 0 0.0102 
0 0 0 
1.178 0 
0 1.125 
0 0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0.5625 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0146 
0 
0 
0 
0.3018 
"161 
'162 
'l63 
*164 
0 
0 
1.178 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.125 
X exp -
0.1349 0 0 0 
0 0.000219 0 0 
0 0 0.2361 0 
0 0 0 0.1099 
'171 
'l72 
*173 
*174 
(43) 
(44) 
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APPLICATION 
To Illustrate for the use of the above formulation, an actual site 
selection undertaking Is considered. The entire process of site evalua­
tion and the selection of the most acceptable site Is done using the 
methodology presented here. Then, the results are compared with the 
outcome of the decision made by the utility company which undertook 
that specific selection task using a different approach. 
Problem Description 
To cater the need for electrical power in eastern Kansas in 1981, 
Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Kansas City Power and Light Company 
proposed Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit no. 1, an 1150 MWe nuclear 
power plant [23]. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
granted the construction permit on October 1975. After preliminary 
screening, three alternative plant locations were selected for further 
evaluation, all of which depended on the John Redmond Reservoir, Figure 
20, as a source of cooling water. The three sites would utilize a 
closed-cycle cooling pond scheme. 
Site 1 is located approximately 3 miles north of the town of 
Ottumwa on the northeast shore of the reservoir. The plant site is 
situated on high ground between two drainages, one formed by Hickory 
Creek which flows into the reservoir and the other by a small unnamed 
stream which also flows into the reservoir. Connecting cooling ponds 
would be developed in each of these drainages for waste-heat dissipation. 
Site 2 and the associated cooling lake will be located in Coffey 
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Figure 20. Site selection for nuclear power plant In John Redmond 
Reservoir region among three alternatives 
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County, which is located in eastern Kansas approximately 75 miles south­
west of Kansas City, 53 miles south of Topeka and 90 miles east-northeast 
of Wichita, Kansas. This is the Wolf Creek site which was finally 
selected by the utility company. 
Site 3 is situated south of the reservoir about 3.5 miles north of 
the Gridley and 7 miles west of Burlington. The cooling pond developed 
for this site would lie in the drainage basin of North Big Creek with an 
unnamed dam across the creek located about 11 miles upstream from its 
confluence with the Neosho River. The reactor site would be located 
near the upstream end of the cooling pond. 
Land use, make-up water use, geological, ecological, meteorological 
and other environmental conditions at the three sites are similar. 
Transmission considerations are also similar, although the transmission 
line distance requirements vary by site. The most desirable site among 
the above mentioned sites has to be selected for the nuclear power plant 
construction. 
The site characteristics and the Intra-characterlstlcs described 
earlier and contained in Table 1 are considered for each alternative 
site. The intra-characterlstlcs levels or outcomes are assessed for 
each site from ref. [24]. These values have been placed in Table 3. It 
must be emphasized that the absolute values of the intra-characterlstlcs 
levels are not Important; rather, they should quantitatively represent 
the relative Importance of the intra-characterlstlcs. The inter-
acceptabilities can be obtained from equations 28 through 44 for each 
Intra-characteristic and then equation 12 may be used to calculate the 
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Table 3* Intra-characterlstlcs levels for John Redmond sites 1, 2, and 
3 for Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Station 
Intra-characterlstlc 
(xij) Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
*11 19.5 13.25 14.9 
*12 1 1 1 
*13 0.25 0.25 0.25 
x14 0 0 50 
*15 2.2 2.2 2.2 
*21 20 20 20 
X22 20 20 20 
*23 20 20 20 
*24 20 20 20 
*25 20 20 20 
*26 20 20 20 
*31 20 20 20 
*32 5 5 5 
x41 80 0 50 
*42 20 20 20 
*43 24 91 100 
*44 80 0 50 
*45 80 0 50 • 
*46 50 100 70 
*51 100 100 100 
*52 100 100 100 
*53 100 100 100 
*54 20 20 20 
*55 80 80 80 
*56 80 80 80 
*61 85 90 100 
*62 1.2 0.5 1.0 
*63 80 100 60 
*64 80 60 100 
*65 0 0 0 
*71 0 0 0 
*72 50 0 0 
*74 50 0 40 
*75 0 0 0 
*76 0 0 0 
*81 100 100 100 
*82 
*83 
0 0 0 
0 0 100 
*91 10 10 10 
*92 0 0 0 
*93 12 12 12 
*94 11 11 11 
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Table 3. Continued 
Intra-characteristic 
(Xij) Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
*95 3 3 3.5 
*101 1 2 1 
*102 0 0 0 
*111 10 10 10 
*112 10 10 10 
*113 10 10 10 
*114 10 10 10 
*121 5 7.9 5 
*122 100 100 100 
*123 100 100 100 
*131 0 0 0 
*132 0 0 0 
*133 0 0 0 
*134 10 10 10 
*141 60 60 60 
*142 80 80 80 
*143 0 0 3 
*144 0 0 0 
*145 0 0 0 
*146 0 0 0 
*147 80 80 80 
*151 9 9 9 
*152 80 80 80 
*153 10 10 10 
*161 60 60 60 
*162 100 100 100 
*163 70 70 70 
*164 100 100 100 
*171 1 2.5 3 
*172 2600 2600 2600 
*173 3.4 2.8 2.9 
*174 32.1 23 24.4 
acceptabilities of the 17 characteristics for each site. The results 
are given in Table 4. Finally, either equation 6 or 17 can be used 
to evaluate the supra-acceptability function for each site. A 
specially developed computer program is used to provide all necessary 
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Table 4. Acceptabilities of characteristics of the proposed three 
sites of Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Station 
Characteristic site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
Yl 0.9747 
Yz 0.8504 
Y3 0.9654 
Y4 0.7918 
Y5 0.9961 
0.9764 
Y7 0.9347 
Y8 0.999 
Y9 0.9380 
YlO 0.6721 
Yll 0.9429 
^12 0.8935 
Yl3 0.9849 
YI4 0.9919 
Y15 0.8129 
YI6 0.9109 
Yl7 0.7247 
0.9747 0.9488 
0.8504 0.8504 
0.9654 0.9654 
1.00 0.9407 
0.9961 0.9961 
0.9854 0.9886 
0.9998 0.9836 
0.999 0.8876 
0.9380 0.9359 
0.7548 0.6721 
0.9429 0.9429 
0.9320 0.8935 
0.9849 0.9849 
0.9919 0.9743 
0.8129 0.8129 
0.9109 0.9109 
0.6777 0.6499 
iterations and to compute the supra-acceptability in each case using 
the relationship 
(45) 
which is obtained from equations 17 and 27. The results are given in 
Table 5. In the present case, the intra-characteristics having the 
same value for all sites may be dropped from the analysis; however, 
these are given here to demonstrate the technique. 
According to equation 18, site 2 is the most acceptable taking in 
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Table 5. Supra-acceptabllity of the proposed 3 John Redmond sites 
Site number (k) Supra-acceptablllty 
1 0.9014 
2 0.9197 
3 0.8970 
consideration all the factors affecting the selection. This agrees 
with the choice made by the concerned utility company mentioned earlier. 
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CONCLUSION 
The methodology developed gives a rational and self-consistent 
approach towards selection of the most desirable site for nuclear power 
plants, where more than one feasible site Is available. A siting 
characteristic such as public acceptance, which Includes attitude of 
environmentalists, regulatory bodies media and occupational groups. 
In addition to other engineering and economic characteristics, has 
been added to accommodate for their growing Influence In site selection. 
Â computer code Is developed which takes Into account the 17 siting 
characteristics and 75 intra-characterlstlcs and selects the most 
desirable site for any number of alternates available. À two-round 
Delphi questionnaire is developed which reconciles the differences 
among various experts in arriving at the indifference probabilities. 
The technique is applied to a practical case where a group of utility 
companies had to select a site for a 1150 MWe nuclear power plant in 
Coffey County, Kansas, among three alternatives. Although the method 
used here for the site selection is entirely different, the results 
indicate that the site selected earlier, namely the Wolf Creek Generat­
ing Station, is the best one. 
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APPENDIX 
First-round Questionnaire 
Please read these instructions carefully. 
You have been selected to participate in a study to develop a 
decision analysis technique for selection of site for nuclear power 
plants. This questionnaire is the first of a series of two question­
naires designed to gather information that only you and your fellow 
workers can provide. The answer you give to the questions could become 
the basis for possible improvement in the current technique of nuclear 
siting. 
1. Please read the instructions for each part carefully, determine 
that you know exactly what is being asked, and give thorough considera­
tions to all aspects of the question before answering. 
2. Please do not discuss your answers with any other person 
engaged in the study until after the second questionnaire is completed. 
This is a critical requirement. Any violation could seriously distort 
the results. 
3. You are allowed to use any records, files, or other source of 
information available to aid you in answering the questions; in fact, 
you are encouraged to do so. The only exception is that you are not to 
discuss the questions or your answers with any other person taking the 
survey. 
Although your name has been identified with this particular answer 
sheet, you should understand that this is required only to compare 
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answers between yourself and other participants ^  a group in the 
following questionnaires. ^ one but yourself and the person conducting 
the survey will know how you answered any particular question. You are 
asked, then, to give honest answers, not the answers that you think 
someone else would like to see. This study is an attempt to gather 
facts, not to falsely justify or condemn any particular policy or 
S  
procedure. Please provide answers that you sincerely feel are as 
accurate as you can make them. 
PART I 
(1) Instructions for providing answers: 
In the questions associated with this study, you will be asked to 
estimate a value from 0 to 10 for each factor considered for site selec­
tion. A 0 value means the least important factor to be considered in 
siting criteria while 10 should be assigned to a factor of highest 
importance. Any value between 0 to 10 can be picked for a particular 
factor according to its importance. 
Least 
important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Most 
important 
9 10 
(a) Cooling water 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(b) Soil properties 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(c) Construction difficulties 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(d) Services availability 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(e) Domestic water 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(f) Accessibility 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(8) Present land use 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(h) Ecology 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(i) Demography 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(j) Topography 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Least Most 
Important Important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
(k) Geology 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(1) Aircraft impact 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(m) Man-made hazards (ship colli­
sion, explosions, flammable 
gases, etc.) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(n) Natural phenomena (tornadoes. 
flood, etc.) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(o) Meteorology 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(P) Public acceptance 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(q) Economical impact 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PART II 
We have further divided each factor considered for nuclear power 
plant site selection in sub-factors. Consider each factor to be inde­
pendent of others. Give a number from 0 to 10 for each group of sub-
factors according to its importance. 
Factor Sub-factors Least impor­
tant 
. , _ Most A number from 
(a) Cooling - Sources 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
water - Availability 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
- Distance 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
- Characteristics 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
- Incremental water temper­
ature *C at peak ambient 
water temp, period of 
year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Classification 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Characteristics 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Properties 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Bearing capacity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Least . . Most 
Factor Sub-factors impor- ^ impor­
tant tant 
- Fixation of rad-waste 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Groundwater 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(c) Construction - Land properties 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Labor 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(d) Services - Electricity a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Gas 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Drainage and sewerage 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Location of services 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Capacities 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Distribution lines 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(e) Domestic - Availability 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
water - Characteristics 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Size, depth and pressure 
of mains 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Consumption 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Distribution systems 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Sources and location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(f) Accessibility - Land characteristics 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
along route of trans­
mission line network 
- Distance to transmission 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
line interties and sub­
station 
- Highway 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Railroad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Waterways 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(g) Land use - Agriculture 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Special land use (parks. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
wildlife refuge, etc.) 
- Residential character 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Public facilities 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Sensitive industries (oil 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
and gas pipelines) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Weapons testing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Land values 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(h) Ecology - River classification 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(irrigation, fishing. 
recreational, wildlife. 
etc.) 
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Least . u r Most 
Factor Sub-factors Impor- impor­
tant tant 
(i) Demography 
- Endangered species 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Biological conditions 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Existing population with­ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
in 1 mile 
- Population within 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
mile, 2020 
- Existing population with­ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
in 20 miles 
- Population within 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
miles, 2020 
- Proximity to nearest 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
population center 
(j) Topography - Number of potential sites 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
per region 
- Terrain for power plant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(k) Geology - Mine hazard 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Oil hazard 0 1 2 3 4 ,5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Seismology 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Tectonic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(1) Aircraft - Proximity to airport 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
impact - Bombing ranges 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Low-level training routes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(m) Man-made - Ship collision and 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
hazards explosion 
- Flammable gases and 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
vapor clouds 
- Toxic chemicals 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Fire 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(n) Natural - Tornadoes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
phenomena - High water from floods 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- High water from dam 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
failure 
- High water from hurri­ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
canes 
- High water from tsunamis 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- High water from seiches 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Low water 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(o) Meteorology - Sustained wind velocity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Least . , - Most 
Factor Sub-factors Impor- . impor­
tant tant 
(p) Public 
acceptance 
(q) Economic 
impact 
Diffusion 
Inversion temperature 
Occupational group 
(unions, merchants, 
and corporations) 
Citizen group (environ­
mentalists, civic associ­
ations, etc.) 
Influential individuals 
(ministers, publishers 
and editors) 
State laws 
The cost of cooling water 
supply related to the 
water intakes, pipelines, 
storage or water supply 
reservoirs, and pumping 
facility required to de­
liver a reliable supply 
of cooling water to a 
plant at each site 
identified 
Land acquisition costs 
Land preparation costs, 
such as clearing, site 
grading, flood protec­
tion, on-site access im­
provements, and relocated 
road and bridge construc­
tion costs 
Foundation cost esti­
mates, such as the cost 
of de-watering, special 
foundation treatment, 
excavating, foundation 
base mats, pile founda­
tions, if required, and 
back-filling 
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
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Second-round Questionnaire 
This is the second of a series of two questionnaires designed to 
gather information concerning a study to develop a decision analysis 
technique for selection of site for nuclear power plants. The same 
questions that appeared in the first questionnaire are repeated here. 
During the first round, you submitted the relative importance of the 
factors being considered for selection among various sites for a nuclear 
power plant. This questionnaire gives you the opportunity to revise any 
of these estimates ^  you feel they can be Improved. 
For each site selection criterion, the following information is 
presented: Your first-round estimate, the average of the estimates 
made by all participants, and the central range of the estimates made 
by all participants. The central range is chosen so that 25% of the 
estimates lie below the lower value and 25% of the estimates lie above 
the upper value. Therefore, the central range itself contains the 
middle 50% of the estimates made for that particular value. 
You are asked to reconsider each of your previous answers, possibly 
revise them, and write your new answer in the space provided. For each 
estimate, if your new estimate lies outside the central range, you are 
asked to state briefly but clearly, in the space provided, the major 
reason or reasons why you feel the estimate should be lower (or higher) 
than those within the central range. 
It should be pointed out that your "new" estimates do not have to be 
different from your first-round estimates. The purpose of this 
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questionnaire Is to give you a chance to reconsider your responses In 
the light of new Information. 
PART II 
Factor Sub-factor 
Group 
Your estimate 
first Aver- Central new 
estl- age range esti­
mate mate 
Major reason 
why you feel 
the estimate 
should be 
lower (or 
higher) than 
those within 
the central 
range 
(a) Cooling 
water 
-Sources 
-Availability 
-Distance 
-Characteristics 
-Incremental 
water tempera­
ture "C at peak 
ambient temp, 
period of year 
(b) Soil -etc. 
(c) Construction -etc. 
(d) Services -etc. 
(e) Domestic 
water 
-etc. 
(f) Accessibility -etc. 
(g) Land use -etc. 
(h) Ecology -etc. 
(i) Demography -etc. 
(j) Topography -etc. 
(k) Geology -etc. 
(1) Aircraft 
Impact 
-etc. 
(m) Man-made 
hazards 
-etc. 
^The reader Is referred to the sub-factors given In Part II of the 
first-round questionnaire. 
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esee 
s„wactor % Z.ITT' 
estl- age range estl- lower (or 
mate mate higher) than 
those within 
the central 
range 
(n) Natural -etc. 
phenomena 
(o) Meteorology -etc. 
(p) Public -etc. 
acceptance 
(q) Economic -etc. 
impact 
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SECTION II. RISK ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE 
PROLIFERATION ROUTES 
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ABSTRACT 
Multi-Attribute Decision Theory is applied to rank 11 alternative 
routes to nuclear proliferation in order of difficulty in acquiring 
nuclear weapons by nonnuclear countries. The method is based on reduc­
ing the various variables affecting the decision to a single function 
providing a measure for the proliferation route. The results Indicate 
that the most difficult route to obtain atomic weapons is through 
nuclear power reactors, specifically the liquid-metal fast breeder 
reactor, heavy water Canada deuterium uranium reactor, and light water 
reactors such as boiling water and pressurized water reactors. The 
easiest routes are supercritical centrifuge isotope separation, laser 
Isotope separation, and research reactor. However, the nonnuclear 
routes, also considered here for comparative purposes, that result in 
substantial damage to life and property are easier than any nuclear 
route. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide depletion of existing energy resources and the vast 
Industrial growth in developing countries have led many nations to con­
sider nuclear electric power generation as one of the most viable energy 
alternatives. There is, however, a growing fear that fissile material 
from the power cycle may be diverted to the production of weapons. 
Several research projects have been directed to the assessment of the 
consequences of the spread of nuclear power plants and to the develop­
ment of new fuel cycles which do not allow for undetected misuse of 
nuclear materials. One of the major efforts is the Nonproliferation 
Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASA?). Concerns over nuclear 
material diversion have resulted in deferral of transfer of nuclear 
technology to nonnuclear countries. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate, in quantitative terms, 
various options of acquiring nuclear weapons material and their relative 
difficulty compared to the use of other destructive materials. A 
deterministic approach based on combinatorial multivariate preferences 
is used in the analysis that encompasses consideration of the various 
facets of the requirements and capabilities in obtaining nuclear weapons. 
The results would be helpful in planning for proliferation deterrence 
and for devlsion appropriate safeguard programs without depriving 
development countries of the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
A factual assessment of the requirements, methods, and difficulties in 
acquiring nuclear weapons Is essential in assessing the impact of 
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nuclear electric power programs in nonnuclear countries on nuclear 
proliferation. It is well-known that complex processes are required 
to produce weapons-grade materials, such as plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium. Also, sophisticated deployment capabilities are 
needed, which are nonexistent in nonnuclear countries. Nevertheless, 
the Interest here is in understanding of the various routes of pro­
liferation and the associated difficulties of acquiring weapons-grade 
materials. 
A number of potential nuclear materials proliferation routes have 
been suggested [1]. For comparison, three nonnuclear destructive material 
proliferation options are included [1]. Those three options do not lead 
to nuclear explosions but are capable of causing significant damage to 
life and property using simpler technologies to those required for 
inducing similar damage by nuclear weapons. The merits of acquiring 
nuclear explosive capability are Judged with respect to five factors: 
1. resources 
2. difficulty of nuclear route 
3. cost and schedule 
4. risks 
5. weapons capability. 
The resources needed to make a nuclear weapon are split into four acquisi­
tion factors—technical sophistication, facility requirements, instru­
mentation capability, and personnel requirements. 
The multidimensionality of the attributes of each proliferation 
route complicates the process of relative ranking among various routes. 
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However, a decision based on intuition or qualitative assessment without 
due consideration of all the facets of the problem has the potential of 
being Incomplete or inconsistent. Consequently, an approach based on 
the multiattribute utility theory is selected as a formal analytical 
methodology for selection of optimal strategies based on quantitative 
measures. Each measure or attribute is represented by a utility or 
objective function. The multiplicity of the objective functions is 
reduced to a univariate objective function through the use of trade-offs 
and multivariate decision theory. The expected value of the objective 
function is used as a guide to identify and rank the degree of difficulty 
of alternative routes. The multiattribute utility theory has been pre­
sented in the literature [2-5] and various applications were demonstrated 
in a variety of decision areas [6-10]. Also, the theory has the 
advantage of providing a tool for quantification of Intangibles [11]. In 
fact, the approach presented here is versatile enough to accommodate 
political factors, expert opinion, and public participation. In the 
context of this paper, the decision-maker is assumed to be a developing 
country in which the planners have a tendency to risk money but otherwise 
are averse to risk of failure. 
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PROLIFERATION ROUTES 
Potential proliferation routes generally Include research facilities, 
which are commonly used In educational and research Institutions, power 
reactors, which are normally operated by government commissions or by 
utility companies, and enrichment facilities, which may be operated with 
or without international license. In addition to those nuclear prolifera­
tion routes, there are accessible means of destruction that could be 
used by groups of Individuals or regular armies and that are different 
from conventional weapons. The dispersal of biological or chemical 
material, radioactive material, or detonation of liquid natural gas 
(LNG) is compared with the difficult task of diversion of nuclear 
materials or the production of weapons-grade material. The alternative 
nuclear material proliferation routes considered here are listed below 
together with other potential arsenal routes: 
1. isotope separation by centrifuge 
2. research reactors 
3. mass spectrograph Isotope separation 
4. small (clandestine) graphite pile 
5. small (clandestine) heavy-water reactor 
6. isotope separation by diffusion 
7. laser isotope separation 
8. Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactor 
9. high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) 
10. light water reactors [such as the pressurized water reactor 
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(FUR) and the boiling water reactor (BWR)] 
11. liquid-metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) 
12. chemical/biological weapons 
13. fission product dispersal weapons 
14. LNG detonation. 
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ACQUISITION FACTORS 
To evaluate the degree of difficulty of acquiring weapons through 
the alternate proliferation routes or other arsenal techniques, a 
number of acquisition factors are considered [1]. These are divided 
into five categories: resources, difficulty of route, cost and 
schedule, risks, and weapons capability, as shown in Table 1. 
To acquire nuclear weapons-grade material, there are specific sources 
that must be present in the developing country interested in such material 
or otherwise the country has to seek those resources in other localities. 
A proliferation effort is likely to be wasted if the party interested in 
the diversion plans does not have the technological ability to design, 
select suitable materials to assemble, weld, cast, and forge the com­
ponents required to make the weapon of interest and the associated 
deployment mechanism. In many developing countries, the technology is 
still in a stage that falls short of production of precise equipment or 
tools and the use of advanced techniques. Technological sophistication 
generally is gained through life experience and is greatly influenced by 
the degree of advancement of the local technology; although one can be 
trained on advanced techniques, the level of technological skill does 
not depend entirely on training, but is greatly shaped by social, 
cultural, and various human factors. An engineer who designs a fully 
automatic machine should have lived through the evolution of the design 
of the manual machine. A specific proliferation route may require more 
or less technological sophistication than others. 
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Table 1. Proliferation route acquisition factors 
Category Acquisition factors 
Resources Technological sophistication 
Facility requirements 
Instrument capability 
Personnel requirements 
Difficulty Availability of Information 
Accessibility of fissile mass 
Cost/schedule Cost 
Schedule (years to completion) 
Risks Risks to personnel 
Risks to project detection 
Weapons capability Rate of weapons-grade fissile mass production 
Weapon reliability 
Financial resources may allow a community to acquire a skill, but 
It could still fall short of having adequate facilities for diversion 
of nuclear material. Facility requirements depend, however, on the 
nature of the proliferation route. In certain situations, existence 
of specific material (other than nuclear material) or a special tool 
may affect the acquisition of weapons-grade material. High Instrumenta­
tion capability Is required for exploiting certain proliferation routes 
such as enrichment devices. Furthermore, each route has a different 
manpower demand. 
The degree of difficulty of acquisition of nuclear weapons-grade 
material depends to a great extent on the availability of the Informa­
tion necessary for diversion or production. Whether such Information 
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Is available or not, the degree of accessibility of fissile material 
has a great Impact on the ability to provide the desired mass In the 
time needed for production. 
Cost of acquisition of nuclear weapons-grade material from a given 
proliferation route and the schedule necessary to reach the desired 
goal would greatly differ from other routes. For example, using a 
mass spectrograph is less costly but takes more time than a centrifuge 
Isotope separator. 
A country alien to the production of nuclear weapons that attempts 
to acquire such capability without being noticed runs the risk of being 
detected and of undermining the safety of personnel engaged in the 
diversion activity. Also, successful attempt of acquiring weapons-
grade fissile mass is affected by the rate of production. The final 
goal of weapons acquisition can only be achieved If the weapon produced 
is reliable enough to warrant viability of using it for the Intended 
purpose. The weapons capability, even if acquired, would require 
sophisticated means of deployment. 
The above-mentioned acquisition factors are the most Important 
factors relevant to developing countries. Such factors, as defined, 
represent a list of Independent items that do not greatly affect each 
other in evaluation of the various proliferation routes. That inde­
pendence is Important for the validity of the decision approach employed 
here. 
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MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION MODEL 
In modeling the decision process of alternative proliferation 
routes, the analyst must obtain an objective function Including the 
multiple attributes which describe the effectiveness of a decision. Such 
an objective function would Indicate the relative ranking of consequences 
and identify the trade-offs among various levels of the different 
attributes [2, 3]. In a risk-free environment, the optimal decision 
would be the one that maximizes the objective function. But the risk 
evaluation decision problem involves uncertainties. One approach is to 
synthesize an objective function such that the decision which maximizes 
the expected value of the objective function is the optimal decision. 
Such an objective function is usually called a utility function. 
By asking simple questions about trade-offs between quantities, 
the decision analyst can find a utility function that can serve as a 
guide in decision-making. If the consequences chosen satisfy certain 
independence properties, the assessment problem is simplified. The two 
independent properties to be considered are preferential independence 
and utility Independence [4]. 
If each consequence is utility Independent of its complements, and 
each pair of consequences is preferentially independent of its comple­
ments, then the multi-consequence utility function, U, takes either of 
two special forms [4-6], namely, the pure product form 
N 
1 + KU = n [1 + Kk.U.(x.)l (1) 
1=1 1 1 1 
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or the pure sum form 
N 
u = i k.u (x ) . (2) 
1=1  ^^   ^
In both equations, U and are utility functions scaled from zero 
for the worst state to one for the best state; the values are 
appropriately selected weights for the given attributes with 0 < < 1, 
and K > -1. The Integer N is the number of attributes and constant K is 
a scaling factor. The weight k^  is usually evaluated as a probability 
that reflects the decision-maker attitude. 
If 
N I = 1 , 
1=1 ^ 
the utility function is of the pure sum form. If 
N i ^ 1 , 
1=1 
the pure product form is appropriate and a value of K must be obtained. 
The utility function U(x) for each consequence is scaled from 0 to 1; 
and hence K is needed so that U may also be scaled from 0 to 1. The 
utility U should be 1 for the most preferred condition, when each of the 
functions U^ (x^ ) equals 0; therefore, K must satisfy the relationship 
N 
1 + K = n (1 - Kk.) . (3) 
1-1 
If 
N 
I ki > 1 , 
1=1 
the multi-consequence utility function exhibits multi-consequence risk 
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aversion; If 
N 
i ki < 1 . 
1=1 ^ 
the utility function exhibits multi-consequence risk seeking; and If 
N Ï = 1 , 
1=1 ^ 
the utility function exhibits multi-consequence risk Indifference. 
The component utility functions can be assessed in a straight­
forward manner [7-10]. From Table 2, where we have chosen the range 
for each acquisition factor, we scale our utility function so that 
(best) = 1 and (worst) = 0. Thus, for risk, of project detection, 
*10 Table 2), for example, U^Q(O) = 1 and UJ^ Q(IOO) = 0. That is, 
the utility of no risk of project detection is unity while a utility 
of zero is assigned for maximum risk project detection. To begin with, 
we find that 18% is indifferent to a lottery yielding 0 or 100%, each 
with probability 0.5. In other words, a 50-50 chance of detection is 
almost the same as when the probability of assured detection is 18%. 
Therefore, the certainty equivalent for the lottery is 
Uj^ Q(18) = 0.5 UJ^ Q(O) + 0.5 UJ^ Q(IOO) = 0.5 , (4) 
which is the utility of 18% probability of risk detection. 
Since 18 is less than the expected value of the lottery, that 
is EJ^ Q(18) = (0.5 X 0 + 0.5 x 100) = 50, thus, the utility function 
exhibits an aversion to risk. 
Â moderate decision-maker would be indifferent to a return for 
Table 2. Acquisition factors for alternate proliferation routes 
Values of attributes for 
alternate acquisition routes 
Acquisition factors, x. 
0) e 
u JS o 0) 
o a M P»*H 
1 
p.a 
0 CO 4J om 
om 4J W CO 0) Tl uen 
MM O 00 h (U M e ON 
•H (0 O CO fH o CO 
<u M a •H M 4-1 •H " 
0) B u U Q) A _ 0) 9 a 
00 O u a 8 4J r4 e o 
3 "H JS 0) (U s eg a O "H 
«W W o «H o< « *J Tt > •H « 
•rt nj M a m A •H C CO CO 
M W CO o o J3 O u 9 k 
4J (d (U •u a *j a O. W o «M CO 
a o> OS 9 a om CO a CO u U-* a 
0) 0> 0) r4 à com M f4 at u •H Q) 
U CO M e, a -rtCM C9 P, P3 CO O CO 
Resources 
1. Technical sophistica­ 80 60 60 60 60 60 
tion, subjective 
2. Facilities requirement. 60 40 60 40 60 60 
subjective 
3. Instrumentation capa­ 60 60 80 80 80 80 
bility, subjective 
4. Personnel requirement, 350 50 350 100 150 350 
persons ' 
Difficulty of Route 
5. Information availa­ 60 20 20 20 20 60 
bility, subjective 
6. Accessibility to fission 40 60 40 60 60 40 
material, subjective 
Cost and Schedule 
7. Cost $10 [7] 10 1 10 1 10 10 
8. Schedule (time to com­ 15 0 15 5.5 5.5 5 
pletion), years 
Risks 
9. Risk to personnel. 40 80 40 80 80 40 
subjective 
10. Risk to project detec­ 20 40 80 40 80 60 
tion, subjective 
Weapon Capability 
1/18 11. Rate of weapons-grade fis­ 25 0.1 1 1 3 
sile production, weapon/yr 
12. Weapon reliability. 20 40 20 40 40 20 
subjective 
I^ndifference probability, 
bpirst core. 
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Values of attributes for 
alternate acquisition routes 
i 
m •> 
= _ * 3 3 
tn m o 4J d o  " « > .  o  «  < 8  Extreme 
o " 5 o values of .a 
B e u  a  hS*SqJ acqulsl- 1 
DO (0 a m g a (0 o, w 
m "H 019 m 9 9rso 
• H U  k  « H  « M  B d « H  « H  C O * H C » ( U C O C D  (d e 5 o r c u oo o w o. w «o 
M M  p o  * pqo M  O  • H O ' H C d O U b O  (UCO QW tl «Q4J SHoacou 
no. E 3  c a  p d  9  k  9  ( u o c o m o u u  
tlon 
factors 
Worst Best 
« < U  < i H  H  » i H  S t H  X - H j ^ U e O Z a  ijoo uo, » pkcu wo. u mo b 0.-h a a 
100 80 80 80 100 20 20 20 100 0 0.3 
40 80 80 80 100 20 20 20 100 0 0.26 
60 100 60 100 100 20 20 20 100 0 0.111 
30 6000 6000 6000 6000 10 10 8 10,000 0 0.22 
100 20 20 20 20 40 20 40 100 0 0.15 
40 100 40 100 100 20 80 20 100 0 0.08 
1 100 100 100 100 1 1 1 100 0 0.12 
15 10 10 10 15 0 0 0 20 0 0.115 
40 80 40 100 100 80 60 40 100 0 0.015 
20 60 80 80 80 20 100 20 100 0 0.18 
23 8 2of 14 11 0 0 0 0 30 0.26 
20 80 20 80 20 20 20 20 100 0 0.0618 
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certain that Is equivalent to the expected value of the lottery. Such 
an attitude Is normally represented by a straight line pattern that 
goes through U = 0 and U = 100. In contrast, a conservative pattern 
exhibits aversion to risk; thus, the decision-maker would accept the 
chances game only if Its alternative is an outcome of higher risk than 
the expected value. The gambler, on the other hand, may prefer the 
lottery even if the alternative Is of low risk for certain and hence a 
risk-taker would only feel indifferent to the lottery or the assured 
outcome if the alternative has a risk much higher than the expected 
risk from the lottery. 
In a similar way, we can choose a few more values for the utility 
function; for example, we find 8% indifferent to a 0 and 18% lottery; 
and 35% indifferent to an 18 and 100% lottery; both at 50-50 chance, 
hence, 
Uio(8) = 0.5 UJ^ Q(O) + 0.5 UiQ(18) = 0.75 (5) 
and 
Uj^ Q(35) = 0.5 U^ qClS) + 0.5 UJ^ Q(IOO) = 0.25 . (6) 
The empirically assessed points are then plotted to represent graphically 
the function dependence of on x^  as shown in Figure 1; here 1 = 10. 
This process is to be repeated for each attribute and a set of 
smoothed utility curves can thus be constructed. Â country or a party 
having the intention to defy International restrictions through diver­
sion of nuclear material would be a risk-taker and hence the utility 
functions associated with some acquisition factors would exhibit a 
U|X«|a 
Uix.o 
Personnel Requirement, *« 
2000 4000 6000 8000 
-r 
VO 
o 
20 40 60 80 
Acquisition Factor, xj 
100 0.00 6.00 12.00 18.00 24.00 30.00 0.00 4.00 8.00 12.00 16.00 20.00 
Rate of Fissile Mass Production, x „ Schedule (Years to Completion), x; 
Figure 1. Utility functions for the acquisition factors considered for alternative proliferation 
routes 
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gambling trend. Such trend Is depicted by slowly decreasing utility 
functions near the attribute value at which the corresponding utility 
is unity. The point representing that value of the attribute is almost 
the center of curvature of the utility curve. Those acquisition 
factors for which the expected utility functions are of the risk-taking 
type are personnel requirements, cost and rate of weapons-grade fissile 
mass production. Countries determined to acquire nuclear weapons are 
likely to take the risk of increased cost, take chances in meeting 
personnel requirements, and be patient for low production rates. The 
trend is reversed with issues such as risk of plan detection and 
facility requirements, where the decision-maker resorts to conservatism. 
Although a gambler may represent a direct threat because of impulsive 
action, a planner seeking diversion of nuclear fuel, who has a certain 
level of aversion to risk in some of his considerations. Is the one who 
is likely to succeed. Figure 1 Illustrates a conservative preference 
pattern in the utility functions associated with 9 of the 12 acquisition 
factors. The curvature of such functions is such that the focal point 
is on the opposite side of the point representing the attribute level of 
the highest utility. The most conservative attitude is toward the risk 
of project detection and the least conservative attitude is toward the 
risk to personnel. 
The utility functions represent the general preference patterns of 
a decision-maker who is commonly a risk averse but willing to gamble 
with respect to cost, personnel requirement, and/or the rate at which 
the fossil mass is produced. Normally, the exact values of the utility 
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function are dependent on the decision-maker. Methods of extracting 
the preferences of a given decision-maker are available, such as the 
Delphi. Other techniques can be used such as the random choice In which 
the preferences In such a sensitive situation can be Inferred from 
answers to a well-designed set of questions which can be Indirectly 
used to probe the actual preferences. 
Generally, under the assumptions given here, the preference pat­
terns will not greatly deviate from those shown In Figure 1 except In 
the degree of conservatism. The approach here Is not greatly sensitive 
to the precision of the utility values for each attribute. The outcome 
of the analysis may change only If the preference pattern Is inverted or 
totally assumed a different shape. 
For computation purposes, each utility function may be fitted to an 
exponential form, that is. 
Uj^ (Xj^ ) = 1.067 exp(-0.02773 x^ ) - 0.06667 (7) 
U2(X2) = 1.032 exp(-0.03469 Xg) - 0.03214 (8) 
= 1.225 exp(-0.01695 x^ ) - 0.2250 (9) 
U^ (x^ ) = 1.098 - 0.09796 exp(0.0002417 x^ ) (10) 
U5(X5) = 1.225 exp(-0.01695 Xg) - 0.2250 (11) 
Ug(xg) = 1.225 exp(-0.01695 Xg) - 0.2250 (12) 
Uy(xy) = 1.2250 - 0.225 exp(0.01695 x,) (13) 
Ug(x8) = 1.038 exp(-0.1658 Xg) - 0.03765 (14) 
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Ug(Xg) = 1.361 exp(-0.01327 Xg) - 0.3612 (15) 
Uio(Xio) = 1.021 exp(-0.03892 x^ g) - 0.02083 (16) 
Uii(Xii) = 1.032 - 1.032 exp(-0.1156 x^ )^ (17) 
"l2^ *12^  = 1.225 exp(-0.01695 x^ g) - 0.225 (18) 
Often, utility functions can be fitted to exponential forms of the type 
given in equations 7 through 18. However, other forms may be used to 
provide the best fit for the data points. In simple computations, 
utility curves can very well serve the purpose. 
As shown from the list of attributes given in Table 1, the measures 
of several attributes are treated as subjective. This is because 
decision-makers are normally inclined to use judgmental analysis based 
on their experience and the Information they acquired. Also, decision­
making is not an exact science, and the present situation is a case of 
decision under uncertainty. To accommodate for uncertainties, the 
utility functions have been synthesized through the lottery game 
described above by going through at least two different ways of prefer­
ence assessment. 
To combine the single-consequence utility functions obtained by the 
procedure above into a single, multi-consequence utility function of the 
pure sum or pure product form, a set of questions would be used to 
estimate the weights, k^ ; such as "For what probability p is the 
decision-maker indifferent to the choice between 
1. The situation with all consequences but the ith, at their 
least preferred values [(Xj) = (Xj *), j ^  1 where the 
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subscript * is used to refer to the least preferred value], 
is 
and the 1th consequence at Its most preferred value 
where superscript * is used to refer to the most preferred 
value). 
2. An alternative with two possible results: all consequences 
at their most preferred values [(x^ ) = (x*), i = 1, ...» N], 
with probability p, or all consequences at their least pre­
ferred values [(Xj^ ) = , i = 1, ..., N] with probability 
of (1 - p)?" 
The utility value of the first alternative is since x^  is at 
its most preferred value [U^ (x*) = 1], and all other consequences are 
at their least preferred values [U^ (Xj*) = 0, j i]; the expected 
utility of the second alternative is p, since there is a chance p of 
obtaining the most preferred situation (which has a utility value of 1), 
and a chance 1 - p of obtaining the least preferred situation (which 
has a utility of 0). For the decision-maker to be indifferent to the 
choice between these two alternatives, the utility value of the first 
alternative must equal the expected utility of the second alternative. 
Therefore, k^  = p, and k^  is a positive number less than 1. It is, 
however, advisable in assessing the k^  values to order their magnitude. 
To do this, we set all 12 attributes given in Table 2 at their worst 
levels and ask the question, "If only one attribute, x^ , i = 1, 2, ..., 
12, could be raised to its best level, which one would be preferred?" 
The response would be attribute x^ . This implies that k^  must be 
assigned the largest value of the k^ s. Had there been indifference 
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between moving either or x^  to Its best level, then would equal 
kj. After several adjustments, the result is in the following order: 
kj . kjj > k^  > > 1=5 > ky 
> kg > kg > kg > k^2 > kg . (19) 
The arrangement of the weights given in equation 19 shows that for 
a successful diversion of nuclear fuel, technological sophistication 
carries higher weight than availability of required facilities ^ ich 
is of the same degree of importance as the rate of production of weapons-
grade fissile mass. The latter is more Important in selecting a given 
proliferation route than availability of information, a factor that 
carries more weight than cost. This is an indication that the developing 
country is expected not to attach much weight to financial risk in 
diversion compared to the value of technological know-how and the 
required facilities and rate of production to achieve its goals. 
Nevertheless, finance of the selected alternative route for prolifera­
tion is rather more critical than the date of completion which is of 
higher weight than acquiring instrumentation capability to assure pre­
cision in production using specific routes. Accessibility to fission 
material comes next, although difficulty in acquisition of such 
material is important to the diversion plan. Such accessibility is 
surely more important than the reliability of the produced weapon. 
Finally, the risk to personnel carries the lowest weight due to the 
nature of the mission. 
After the relative values are established among k^ , their numerical 
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values are estimated using the lottery game described above and the 
results are listed In Table 2. The attribute levels of the degree to 
which a particular alternative contributes In evaluating the utility 
function are also given In Table 2, which contains the extreme values 
of the acquisition factors. 
The attribute levels are estimated for each alternative based on 
the expected experience In typical developing countries which are con­
sidering the use of nuclear power. 
A deterministic evaluation of the acquisition factors for each 
proliferation rank Is performed based on the best engineering judgments, 
subjective evaluations, and current technical information. Most of the 
acquisition factors can only be evaluated In subjective units. In which 
case the best and the worst values are arbitrarily assigned as 0 and 100, 
respectively. In other cases, relevant units are used. The relative 
ranking rather than absolute levels Is important In the decision model. 
To evaluate multi-consequence utility function U for each alterna­
tive proliferation route, equation 1 is relevant since K = -0.797 from 
equation 3. Â computer program yields the utility values for each pro­
liferation route, which are given in Table 3. The higher the utility 
value for a proliferation route, the easier is the weapons acquisition. 
We notice that the easiest routes are the nonnuclear options, which are 
Included for comparison with the proliferation routes, that is, LNG/gas 
detonation, chemical/biological dispersal, and fission product dispersal. 
Among the nuclear proliferation routes, the LMFBR is the hardest ; next, 
in order of the degree of difficulty, are the CANDU reactor and 
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Table 3. Degree of difficulty for alternative routes to proliferation 
Relative 
Utllltv ease of 
Proliferation routes  ^' weapons 
acquisi­
tion 
LNG/gas detonation 0.7332 
Chemical/biological dispersal 0.7311 
Fission product dispersal 0.6937 
Supercritical centrifuge isotope separation 0.6417 
Laser isotope separation 0.6352 
Research reactor 0.5907 
Clandestine graphite pile 0.5557 
Diffusion Isotope separation 0.5244 
HTGR 0.5183 
Clandestine heavy water reactor 0.5150 
Mass spectrograph Isotope separation 0.4909 
PWR/BWR 0.4534 
CANDU reactor 0.4199 
LMFBR 0.4123 
Easiest 
Hardest 
FWR/BHR. Easiest nuclear routes to proliferation are the supercritical 
centrifuge isotope separation, laser Isotope separation, and the 
research reactor, in order of the degree of ease to weapons acquisition. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
An objective assessment of the alternative routes to acquire 
nuclear weapons Is essential to arrive at a coherent policy for pro­
liferation deterrence. In this paper, we have used a quantitative 
decision model, based on the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory, to arrive 
at the relative ranking of 14 Important routes. Eleven of the routes 
considered result In nuclear explosives; the rest are nonnuclear In 
nature but are capable of significant damage to life and property of 
the public. The results Indicate that the most difficult route to 
acquire nuclear weapons for a nonnuclear country Is through nuclear 
power reactors, specifically LMFBRs, heavy water CANDU reactors, and 
light water reactors (BNRs/PWRs). The easier routes are through super­
critical centrifuge Isotope separation, laser Isotope separation, and 
research reactor. The easiest path available to Incur substantial 
damage to life and property Is, however, unrelated to nuclear explosives, 
such as LNG detonation, chemical/biological dispersal, and fission 
product dispersal. 
The limitation of the study essentially emerges from the difficulty 
of validating the underlying assumptions of the model, namely the prefer­
ential and the utility Independence. Deterministic values are assigned 
to the acquisition factors for the sake of simplicity. Uncertainty can 
be accounted for by using probability distributions and more Involved 
computations. Further, a sensitivity analysis is suggested to assess 
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the Impact of different utility functions, and to screen out the dominant 
acquisition factors. 
\ 
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ABSTRACT 
A method Is developed to propagate uncertainties in the basic 
event unavailabilities through a logic model to obtain the transient 
overpower event unavailability. The method consists of combining 
probability distributions in the discrete form without performing any 
sampling. The results are shown to be sufficiently accurate and con­
tain no sampling errors; the computation time is considerably less 
compared to Monte Carlo simulation and histogram propagation. 
Uncertainty propagation methods are found to be sensitive to the spread 
of the basic event unavailability distributions; the proposed method 
produces results less conservative compared to those from propagation 
of moments or Monte Carlo simulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In risk assessment of large technological systems, such as nuclear 
power plants (NPPs), uncertainty Is Involved at various stages of the 
analysis, ranging from the failure data analysis to the phenomenology 
of core melt. Here, we deal specifically with the uncertainty in the 
basic event failure data and present a method for propagating uncertainty 
to quantify system unavailability. 
It Is well-known that, because of the relatively short operating 
experience of NPPs, significant data bases of many component failure 
times are lacking and this is one important factor of many reflected in 
uncertainty in the failure rates. A realistic approach is to quantify 
uncertainty in the component failure rates in the form of probability 
distributions. A quantity of Interest in risk assessment is the proba­
bility of failure of a standby safety system when it is demanded (also 
called "conditional unavailability") in the event of an abnormal 
transient. A system logic model, such as a fault tree or reliability 
block diagram, is constructed to determine various failure modes or cut­
sets of the system to quantify the system unavailability and the associ­
ated uncertainty. The uncertainties in the basic event unavailabilities 
are propagated to obtain the uncertainty in the transient overpower 
(TOP) event unavailability. 
In this paper, a method is presented for propagating uncertainty in 
the discrete form. Here, the discrete probability distributions (DPDs) 
of the basic event unavailabilities are propagated as complete 
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distributions, so that no sampling is necessary; this avoids sampling 
errors. The DFD method, originally proposed by Kaplan [1], is 
developed here for efficient use in probabilistic risk analysis (PRÂ). 
The method is compared with exact analytical results, as well as with 
other methods of uncertainty propagation, such as Monte Carlo simula­
tion and the method of moments. The DFD method is also compared with 
the combination of probability distributions in the form of histograms 
developed by Colombo and Jaarsma [2]. 
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A CASE FOR DISCRETE DISTRIBUTIONS IN PRA 
Combining random variables using Monte Carlo requires random 
sampling from the distributions. In probabilistic risk assessment of 
NPPs, this may pose some problem, particularly because the uncertainty 
in the failure data of the basic events is large and the distributions 
positively skewed. Because the tail of the failure rate distribution 
of basic events can be spread by orders of magnitude, the resultant 
distribution through Monte Carlo would be sensitive to the random 
sampling at the tails of the distribution. Too many points picked up 
at higher values of probability distribution of competent failure rates 
(or component unavailability) would result in a very conservative final 
distribution. On the other hand, if not enough points are picked up at 
the tails, the results may be very optimistic. 
One way to deal with this situation is to discretlze the failure 
rate distributions of the basic events and perform Monte Carlo analyses 
of the discrete distributions. Discrete distributions have the follow­
ing advantages over continuous probability distributions [3]. 
1. Since we consider the subjective probability framework to be 
appropriate for PRA, it is much more flexible to have subjective distri­
butions in the form of discrete distributions. This is compatible with 
the limited failure data available from the nuclear Industiry. The data 
analysis techniques should not be more refined than the available data 
suggest. The restrictions imposed on the failure distribution data of 
a component by assigning a continuous probability distribution are 
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unrealistic since we do not have enough Information to Identify a con­
tinuous distribution. The best we can do Is derive a failure rate (or 
failures per demand) distribution In the discrete form. 
2. The basic failure rate distribution for the newly designed 
components can be formulated In the discrete form by pooling relevant 
information such as design, failure history of similar components, 
subjective assessment, and the best engineering judgment. This can be 
best obtained in the form of probability histograms. Methods of con­
structing subjective probability distributions are well-documented in 
the literature and have been successfully used to quantify expert 
opinion [4-8]. 
3. By formulating DPDs of component failure rates, we ensure that 
Monte Carlo sampling uses values that are realistic and not dependent 
on the properties of the distribution (such as large tails of log-normal 
distribution). 
4. The human error probability data available are often in terms 
of a median value and lower and upper bounds [9]. One way to incorpor­
ate all the information is to fit a three-parameter continuous distribu­
tion [3]. A less complex but more realistic technique is to formulate a 
DPD that satisfies the conditions above. 
Rather than using Monte Carlo sampling, however, the DPD method per­
forms the complete combination of distributions. Here, instead of random 
sampling, probability distributions in the discrete form are propagated. 
This combination procedure is "exact"; I.e., no errors due to sampling 
are Introduced. 
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DISCRETE PROPAGATION 
The DPD Method 
Operations like the product or sum of DPDs can be defined using 
basic axioms of the calculus of probability. Thus, If f^ (X) and f^ CY) 
are probability distributions of Independent random variables X and Y, 
so that 
f^ (X) H <x^ ,p^ >, <X2,p2>. •••» 
and 
fy(Y) = <72*92=" 
then 
+ '"l + ya'plv "^n + vpnv 
and 
'z'xy") = 'vz'plv 'vm-w-
where 
<> = cell of the histogram 
X and y = values of the random variables X and Y 
p and q = associated probabilities. 
As an example, if we represent discrete distributions X and Y (as 
shown in Figure 1), then the probabilistic sum X + Y and multiplication 
X'Y obtained through the DPD method are also shown in Figure 1. The 
calculatlonal procedure for obtaining the discrete distribution for the 
random variable (RV) X + Y is shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 1. Addition and multiplication of random variable in discrete 
form 
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Table 1. Calculation of the probabilistic sum X + Y 
All combinations Reduced from 
Value Probability Value Probability 
3 (0.25)(0.3) 0.075 3 0.075 
4 (0.25)(0.4) s 0.10 4 0.10 + 0.15 = 0.25 
5 (0.25)(0.3) 8 0.075 5 0.075 + 0.20 + 0.75 
4 (0.50)(0.3) S 0.15 6 0.15 + 0.10 = 0.25 
5 (0.50)(0.4) 0.20 7 0.075 
6 (0.50)(0.3) 8 0.15 
5 (0.25)(0.3) a 0.075 
6 (0.25)(0.4) = 0.10 
7 (0.25)(0.3) = 0.075 
0.35 
Comparison with Analytical Results 
To Illustrate the results from the DPD method, let us combine a 
set of RVs for which the resultant distribution can be found analyti­
cally. For this purpose, we shall use the result that the product of n 
2 Identical log-normal distributions, each with mean a and variance 3 , 
Is also a log-normal distribution with 
a = (1) 
P 
and 
+ a^)" - (A" , (2) 
2 
where a and 3 are the mean and variance of the product, respectively. 
P P 
Also, the parameters of the resultant log-normal distribution are given 
by 
g2 
= In (—Ç + 1) (3) 
P «2 
P 
Ill 
and 
li = ln(c* ) - i . (4) 
P P ^ P 
2 We consider five log-normal distributions with a = 10 and 3 = 100; the 
parameters of the products of log-normal distributions are obtained 
using equations 1 through 4 as => 1.86 and = 9.78. The cumulative 
probability distribution obtained analytically is plotted in Figure 2. 
The product of the log-normal distributions is next obtained using 
2 the DPD method. The log-normal distribution with a = 10 and B = 100 
is discretized with equal probability intervals, as shown in Table 2. 
The DPD method is next applied to obtain the product of discrete 
distributions, using a computer code described In Section V, and the 
results are given in Table 3. Various percentile points obtained by 
the DFD method are also plotted in Figure 2 against the distribution 
obtained analytically. The results Indicate that the DPD method is close 
to the exact distribution. 
Comparison with Histogram Method and Monte Carlo Simulation 
Combining RVs in the form of probability histograms was first 
proposed by Ingram et al. [10] and later developed by Colombo and 
Jaarsma [2]. Here, the DPD and histogram methods are compared in terms 
of accuracy and computer time; they are also compared with Monte Carlo 
simulation with varying sample sizes. 
The example chosen is from Appendix II of Ref. 11, where six log-
normal RVs are combined. The final expressions for the TOP event 
1.0 
0.8 -
1 
t 0.6 - • DPD Method 
& 
1 0.4 —m Analytical Results 
1 
u 
O 
d
 
d
 
10^ 10^ 10*^ 10® 10® 10^ 
Value 
Figure 2. Comparison of product of five identical log-normal distributions with DPD method of 
uncertainty propagation 
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Table 2. Discretization of log-normal distribution with mean = 10 and 
variance = 100 
Value Probability Cumulative probability 
1.79 
3.34 
4.73 
6.19 
8.08 
10.56 
15.00 
27.87 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.250 
0.375 
0.500 
0.625 
0.750 
0.875 
1.000 
Table 3. Multiplication of five log-normal distributions 
Cumulative 
percentile 
Exact ' 
value 
DPD 
method 
1st 2.3x10^ 2.8x10^ 
5th 8.3x10^ 9.1x10^ 
10th 1.6x10^ 2.0x10^ 
25th 5.0x10^ 5.4x10^ 
50th 1.8x10^ 1.8x10^ 
75th 6.2x10^ 6.0x10^ 
95 th 3.8x10^ 3.6x10^ 
99th 1.3x10® 1.1x10® 
unavailability are obtained for two cases—uncoupled and coupled—and 
are, respectively: 
P(T) = + (X2 + Xg)'(X^ + Xg) + Xg + (Xg'Xg'Xg)^/^ 
and 
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Coupled - *1 + * h * <4)^" • 
For the DPD method, the component unavailabilities for Xg, ..., 
Xg are each dlscretlzed into five equal probability intervals, as shown 
in Table 4. Results obtained through the DPD method for the coupled 
and uncoupled cases are given in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. The 
results of the Monte Carlo simulation for sample sizes 1200, 2600, 
4800, and 6000 are evaluated by using the SAMPLE computer code [ll]. 
Reactor Safety Study (RSS) evaluations of Monte Carlo simulation, as 
well as the results of the histogram method reported in Ref. 12, are 
also given in Tables 5 and 6. 
The results indicate that both the DPD and histogram methods match 
the Monte Carlo simulation closely. Monte Carlo with increasing sample 
size is used to determine the pattern of function convergence. However, 
because of the sampling error, it is not obvious where the function 
converges. No assumptions, other than discrete approximation of continu­
ous log-normal distributions, are made in the case of the DPD method, 
which shows lower values at higher percentile points. Thus, the DPD 
method not only avoids the sampling errors involved in Monte Carlo 
simulation, but also keeps the resultant function uncertainty from becom­
ing unnecessarily large because of the large tails of log-normal distribu­
tions of the basic event unavailabities. 
The histogram propagation method essentially provides the same 
results as the PDP method but requires a much longer computer time 
because it requires twice as many computations. Computer time increases 
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Table 4. Discrete distribution of component unavailability used to 
obtain TOP event unavailability by DPD method 
Compo- Probabilitv 
nent 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
x. 4.1x10"^ 7.1x10"^ l.OxlO"^ 1.4x10"^ 2.7x10"^ X 
X, 1.2x10'^ 2.1x10"^ 3.0x10"^ 4.3x10"^ 8.1x10"^ 
X3 4.1x10"^ 7.1x10"^ l.OxlO"^ 1.4x10"^ 2.7x10"^ 
X 1.2x10"^ 2.1x10"^ 3.0x10"^ 4.3x10"^ 8.1x10"^ 4 
Xr 4.1x10"^ 7.1x10"^ l.OxlO"^ 1.4x10"^ 2.7x10"^ 
x: 1.7x10"^ 2.4x10"^ 3.0x10"^ 3.8x10"^ 5.5x10"^ 
Table 5. TOP event unavailability obtained by DPD, histogram, and 
Monte Carlo methods for uncoupled case (xlO~^) 
Monte Carlo (sample sizes) 
Cumulative RSS^ This report ^gram" 
probability 12OO 1200 2600 4800 6000 method 
5th 4.54 4.41 4.50 4.48 4.47 4.38 4.54 
10th 5.08 4.99 5.09 5.09 5.03 4.98 5.12 
20th 5.86 5.86 5.86 5.86 5.83 5.82 5.93 
50th 7.75 7.74 7.75 7.80 7.76 7.98 7.95 
80th 10.60 10.32 10.25 10.48 10.45 11.40 10.50 
90th 12.40 12.19 12.11 12.33 12.22 14.00 12.15 
95th 14.40 13.99 13.99 14.26 14.08 17.10 13.65 
CPUb tlme(s) 1.151 2.391 4.337 5.400 88.00^ 2.781 
^he RSS provides the upper end 
related to the sampling error. 
^CPU = central processing unit, 
cpor both coupled and uncoupled 
values of the confidence interval 
cases. 
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Table 6. TOP event unavailability obtained by DPD, histogram, and 
Monte Carlo Methods for coupled case (xlO~^) 
Monte Carlo (sample sizes) 
Cumulative 
probability RSS® 1200 1200 
This 
2600 
reoort 
4800 6000 
Histo­
gram 
method 
DPD 
method 
5th 4.2 4.33 4.26 4.25 4.23 4.14 4.20 
10th 4.85 4.88 4.86 4.78 4.76 4.81 
20th 5.66 5.71 5.73 5.67 5.64 5.73 
50th 8.2 8.04 7.94 8.07 8.02 7.99 8.32 
80th 12.02 12.02 12.01 11.94 12.00 12.67 
90th 15.60 15.53 15.51 15.38 15.60 14.62 
95 th 20.0 19.30 19.43 19.51 19.43 20.20 17.01 
CPU time(s) 1.147 2.388 4.330 5.409 88.00^ 0.159 
^The RSS provides the upper end values of the confidence interval 
related to the sampling error. 
bpor both coupled and uncoupled cases. 
rapidly with larger sample size in Monte Carlo simulation. For a com­
plex function, a large sample size is required to arrive at results 
with reasonably small sampling error. This situation is handled by 
considering only discrete points in the continuous distribution in the 
DPD and histogram methods. The approximation imposed does not 
compromise the accuracy of the results, as we noticed in the section 
Comparison with Analytical Results. 
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SENSITIVITY STUDY 
The sensitivity of the spread of basic event unavailability 
distributions on the TOP event unavailability, pertaining to DPD and 
other uncertainty propagation techniques, is investigated in this sec­
tion. Along with the DPD method, two other uncertainty propagation 
techniques, the method of moments and Monte Carlo simulation, are 
considered. 
In the method of moments, if X and Y are two random variables, then 
the expectation of the sum of the random variables Is the sum of the 
expectations of the random variables; that is, 
"(X+Y) ° "x "Y * 
Also, considering that the events X and Y are independent, the variance 
(second moment about the mean) of the sum of the random variables is the 
sum of the variances or 
Similarly, for the expectation of the product of two random variables. 
(6) 
®(X'Y) ' "x*®^ ' (7) 
again considering events X and Y as Independent. In addition. 
(8) 
Further, a log-normal fit to the mean and variance is evaluated 
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analytically, and various percentile points, such as the 5th and 95th, 
are calculated. To Investigate the sensitivity of the uncertainty 
propagation technique to the basic event uncertainty, a number of 
sample cases were studied, ranging from simple to complex unavailability 
expressions. To Illustrate and compare the methods, let us consider the 
TOP event unavailability represented by 
TOP = + XgXg + X^Xg + Xg , (9) 
where X^, Xg, .., Xg are the unavailabilities of the basic events. 
The data for the basic events are available in the form of median and 
range factors (RF); 
^ median 95 th percentile , 
5th percentile ~ median * 
the median values for X^, Xg, ..., Xg are 0.001, 0.03, 0.01, 0.03, 0.01, 
and 0.003, respectively. Two cases for this example are given; in 
case 1, all basic events have RF = 3, and in case 2, all basic events 
have RF = 10. In the Monte Carlo method, sanQile sizes of 3000 and 1200 
were run with log-normal distribution. To propagate uncertainty through 
the DPDs, the log-normal distributions of the basic events were dlscre-
tlzed into five cells with probabilities 0.15, 0.20, 0.30, 0.20, and 
0.15; the probability of each cell is associated at its mean cell value 
rather than the midpoint, which allows us to associate the probabilities 
at the tails of the distribution at the first and fifth Intervals. The 
propagation of discrete distribution is also considered through Monte 
Carlo sampling for the sample size of 1200. For the method of moments. 
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the mean and variance of the basic events were evaluated for log-normal 
distribution, and equations 5 through 8 were used. The results of this 
example are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. System unavailability by different uncertainty propagation 
techniques for sample case (X^ + X2X3 + X4X5 + Xg) (where 
Xi, i = 1, 2 6 are the unavailabilities of the basic 
events) 
Uncertainty 
methods 
Percentile 
5th Median Mean 95th 
Standard 
deviation 
(variance) 
Case 1 - Small Spread for Basic Events (RF = 3) 
0.00247 0.00530 0.005936 0.0146 Discrete 
Method of moments 
Monte Carlo 
Sample size 3000 
Sample size 1200 
0.00267 0.00527 0.005936 0.0132 
0.00261 0.00531 0.005955 0.0113 
0.00260 0.00531 0.005996 0.0114 
Discrete size 1200 0.00271 0.00524 0.005788 0.0110 
0.00269 
(0.0000072) 
0.00307 
(0.0000094) 
0.00294 
(0.0000086) 
0.00305 
(0.0000093) 
0.00250 
(0.0000063) 
Case 2 - Large Spread for Basic Events (RF = 10) 
Discrete 
Method of moments 
Monte Carlo 
Sample size 3000 
Sample size 1200 
0.00187 0.00875 0.01490 
0.000836 0.00670 0.01491 
0.00187 0.00848 0.01426 
0.00183 0.00874 0.01477 
Discrete size 1200 0.00197 0.00931 0.01402 
0.04542 0.01464 
(0.000214) 
0.05367 0.0296 
(0.000876) 
0.04407 0.01993 
(0.000397) 
0.04493 0.02174 
(0.000473) 
0.04337 0.01375 
(0.000189) 
120 
For less spread In the basic event distribution (RF = 3), there 
are no significant differences in the result. However, the differences 
are pronounced when the uncertainty increases (RF = 10). Here, we 
notice that the method of moments gives a much wider spread; the 
standard deviation is -100% larger than for the discrete case. Also, 
the Monte Carlo using continuous log-normal gives a larger spread com­
pared to the discrete case (standard deviation is -35% larger), which 
is because the tail is truncated in the discretization scheme. With more 
complex unavailability expressions than considered here (equation 9), 
Monte Carlo results become more sensitive to sample size. 
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COMPUTER CODE PUFD 
The computer code PUFD (propagation of uncertainty through finite 
probability distribution) is a general purpose computer program developed 
to perform uncertainty analysis by propagating distribution of the 
random variables in the discrete form [13]. The method is described 
in The DPD Method section. As opposed to the Monte Carlo approach, 
this program does not admit sampling on the variables, thus avoiding 
sampling errors. Most mathematical operations can be performed on the 
random variables. Various statistics of the resultant distribution are 
provided. 
The PUFD program reads and evaluates a user-defined algebraic 
function of Boolean expression. Each independent variable in the 
function may have up to ten input values with associated probabilities. 
The program evaluates the function for every combination of independent 
variables and calculates the probability for that functional evaluation 
by taking the product of the associated probabilities. 
A typical PUFD run might require several hundred thousand functional 
evaluations. It would not be practical to store each functional value. 
The program groups the probabilities associated with each functional 
evaluation into user-defined cells based on functional value. Consider 
the user input function F = A'B + CD + D*E + B'C'D and the input vari­
able values and associated probabilities 
A — a^,pCaj^) ' • • • > î 1 — » 
B = b^ipCb^) »b2»p(b2) » • • • > bj ,p(bj) ! j — 10 , 
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C — }C29p(c2) f •••» c^»p(c^) » k S 10 , 
D = dj^ypCdji^) yd2»p(d2) « •••» dj^jpCdj^) } 1 £ 10 , 
and 
E = ej^,p(ej^),e2.p(e2), .... e^,p(eg^) J m S 10 , 
where the lower case letters represent the values of the respective 
random variables A, B, ...» E, and the p(') is the probability of (•)• 
This case will require i*j*k*l*m function evaluations. The first 
function value will be f = a^'b^ + c^'d^ + d^'e^ + b^'c^'d^ and its 
associated probability will be p = p(ap'pCb^^)'pCc^ «pCd^^) «pCe^^) . 
The program will now search the mesh to find the cell in which to 
add the probability p. Assuming a mesh array M where M(0) is less than 
the minimum f and M(N) is greater than or equal to the maximum f, then 
a J exists so that M(J-l) < f ^ M(J). The program finds this J and 
increments the probability for cell J by p. This procedure is repeated 
for every combination of independent variables. 
There are limitations on the number of random variables and the 
number of probability cells for each random variable. Up to ten inde­
pendent random variables and ten probability values for each random 
variable are the upper limits of practicality. The cells for the final 
histogram result can be 100 at the maximum. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A method has been developed to propagate uncertainty in the form 
of DPDs (Ref. 5). The DPD method has been shown to be sufficiently 
accurate by comparing its results with analytical results. This 
method was compared with the Monte Carlo simulation and histogram propa­
gation methods and produced similar results. A sensitivity analysis 
was performed with varying spreads of the basic event unavailability 
distributions and the DPD, Monte Carlo simulation, and method of moments 
compared for accuracy of results. The results Indicate that the method 
of moments and Monte Carlo simulation give conservative results compared 
to the DPD method. 
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ABSTRACT 
Quantification of risk of large technological systems, such as 
nuclear power plants, is often done on the basis of point estimates. 
However, one source of confusion and controversy is the choice of point 
estimates for the basic event unavailabilities and the Interpretation 
of the system unavailability thus obtained. It is shown through several 
examples that the system unavailability obtained by using median values 
of the basic event unavailabilities results in a very optimistic 
estimate and does not represent the central tendency of the TOP event 
probability distribution. On the other hand, the use of mean values 
of the basic event unavailability results in a conservative system 
unavailability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Point estimates of basic event unavailability are used in a number 
of recent plant risk studies [1-3] to evaluate system unavailability 
through fault tree or event tree modelling. Some basic concepts of point 
estimate and its relationship to the related probability distribution 
need to be clearly understood to derive a meaning from the calculated 
numerical value. This paper is devoted to clarifying various misconcep­
tions on the use of point estimate values. Some suggestions are provided 
to quantify and propagate the point estimate of basic events to evaluate 
point estimate system unavailability. 
One basic misconception is that the point estimate of the TOP event 
unavailability (system unavailability obtained, e.g., by probabilistic 
evaluations of a Boolean expression) obtained by using the median values 
of the basic events, is close to the median value. This point estimate 
is frequently interpreted as the median value and compared with the 
median unavailability of the corresponding system studied somewhere else, 
e.g., in Reactor Safety Study [4]. It is shown in this paper that the 
point estimate of the system unavailability thus obtained may be very 
optimistic, i.e., it may lie at the lower tail of the unavailability 
distribution of the TOP event, thus departing dramatically from the 
median unavailability obtained by propagating complete distributions. 
Characteristics of the failure data for use in assessment are 
described in the next section. Quantifications of the TOP event unavail­
ability by propagating uncertainty in the failure data and using various 
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point estimates are described In the System Unavailability section. 
Several examples are given In the Examples section, and discussions and 
conclusions regarding the validity and usefulness of different point 
estimate evaluations are given in the Discussion and Conclusion section. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF FAILURE DATA 
Failure data available for quantification of the risk associated 
with large technological systems, such as nuclear power plants, are 
limited. For a plant-specific risk study, the limited failure history 
of its components leads to large uncertainty associated with the failure 
parameter of interest (failures per hour, or failures per demand). In 
the light of the limited data for the plant under study, failure data 
for similar components from elsewhere in the Industry may be used to 
infer the failure rate of the specific component. In this case, plant-
to-plant variability (due to different environmental conditions, manu­
facturers, and material properties) is a source of added uncertainty in 
the failure rate of the component. Lognormal distribution has been used 
for component failure rates in all plant risk studies to incorporate the 
uncertainty of orders of magnitude in the failure rate. The character­
istics of lognormal distribution are that it is positively skewed, its 
higher tail may be orders of magnitude larger and the mean value is 
greater than the median, depending on the skewness of the distribution. 
If M and o are the parameters of the lognormal probability density 
function, 
f(X) = ^ exp [-(InX - u)^/2a^] (1) 
/2ïïaA 
for the random variable X, then it can be shown that 
W = ln(Xos.Xgs)l/2 (2) 
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and 
In - W 
° ° 1.645 (3) 
where and are the 5th and 95th percentile estimates, respective­
ly, of the failures per unit time or the failures per demand of the 
component of Interest. If we define the dispersion In the data for 
lognormal distribution In terms of the range factor (RF) as 
= ^  (4) 
50 05 
then. 
^50 ° *^^05^95 (5) 
where is the median value. The mean Is given by 
mean = X^^'e* (6) 
There are various ways of estimating X^g and X^^; thus, using various 
data sources, one can assess the X^g and X^g directly [5]. However, In 
cases where It Is more convenient to obtain X^^ and a RF, as in the 
Reactor Safety Study, X^^ and X^g can be obtained from equation 4. 
Parameters of the lognormal distribution m and a are then evaluated 
from equations 2 and 3. 
Mean and Median 
As mentioned earlier, for a positively skewed distribution (such 
as a lognormal distribution), the mean is larger than the median. The 
relationship between the mean and the median depends only on the RF of 
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the lognormal distribution and is given by 
Figure 1 is a plot of equation 7. We notice that the ratio of mean 
to median increases exponentially with the increase in RF, which repre­
sents the spread in the basic event unavailability. For further clarity, 
graphic representations of the locations of the mean values of the log-
normal probability density functions for a fixed median value and vary­
ing RFs are given in Figure 2. Here, four distributions are shown on a 
-4 lognormal plot with the median unavailability 5*10 and RFs of 3, 10, 
25 and 50. We see clearly that with the Increase in RF, the mean values 
depart increasingly from the median and shift toward the higher tail of 
the unavailability distribution. Therefore, for higher RFs, mean values 
are not representative of the central tendency of the lognormal distribu­
tion. On the other hand, median values, from their definition, do repre­
sent the central tendency of the distribution. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between mean and median of lognormal distribution with varying range 
factors 
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Figure 2. Mean values of lognormal distributions with fixed median and varying range factors 
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SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY 
To obtain the system unavailability, a logic model—such as a 
fault tree or reliability block diagram-—is first constructed. A Boolean 
expression of the system failure is then obtained, which delineates 
qualitatively the various ways the system can fail. The Boolean expres­
sion can then be converted to a probability statement using the calculus 
of probability. For example, if X represents the event 'failure of 
valve x', and Y represents the event 'failure of valve y', and if x and 
y both have to fail for the system (represented by TOP) to fail, then 
the Boolean expression can be written as 
TOP = X*Y . (8) 
The corresponding probability statement is 
P(TOP) = P(X.Y) 
= P(X)P(Y/X) (9) 
If X and Y are independent, then 
P(TOP) = P(X)P(Y) . (10) 
On the other hand, if the system fails when either X or Y fails, then 
TOP = X + Y (11) 
and the corresponding probability statement is 
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P(TOP) = P(X + Y) 
= P(X) + P(Y) - P(X'Y) (12) 
Again, if X and Y are independent, then 
P(TOP) = P(X) + P(Y) - P(X)P(Y) (13) 
In risk assessment, the failure probabilities are generally small and 
the product term in equation 13 is negligible. Thus, we can write 
The Boolean expression obtained for a system failure such as that 
in a nuclear power plant may be very complex, and the corresponding 
probability statement in the exact form is difficult to obtain. 
Fortunately, simplifications like those represented in equation 14 intro­
duce negligible error and can be used safely. We would now like to 
obtain the distribution P(TOP) by propagating the basic event distribu­
tions, such as P(X) and P(Y), in the equations above that will give us 
the uncertainty in the system unavailability [6]. For comparison, we 
shall also obtain the system unavailability P(TOP) by using point 
estimates of the basic event unavailability. Two different point 
estimates of P(TOP) will be obtained by using (1) expected or mean 
values of the basic event unavailabilities and (2) median values of the 
basic event unavailabilities. In case (1), it can be shown that, for 
equation 10, 
P(TOP) = P(X) + P(Y) (14) 
E(TOP) = E(X)E(Y) (15) 
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and for equation 14, 
E(TOP) = E(X) + E(Y) (16) 
where E(*) represents the expected or the mean value of the variable (*). 
Thus, In a Boolean expression, the mean values used for the basic event 
unavailability can be propagated to obtain the mean value of the TOP 
event. Unfortunately, this simplicity Is lost when median unavailability 
Is used as the basic event point estimate. That Is, we cannot propagate 
the median unavailability In a Boolean expression to obtain the median 
unavailability of the TOP event unless the Boolean expression Is In the 
multiplicative form only. 
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EXAMPLES 
Here, a number of Boolean expressions are chosen to represent the 
TOP event, and their unavailabilities are evaluated by propagating the 
basic event unavailabilities. The TOP event unavailability is obtained 
by propagating the basic event unavailability distribution by using 
Monte Carlo to include uncertainty. The SAMPLE computer code, which 
was also used in the RSS study, is used here for uncertainty propagation. 
Mean and median values of the basic events are also used to arrive at the 
point values of the system unavailability. 
Example 1. Simple Boolean Equation and Small Uncertainty 
in Basic Event Unavailability 
The following Boolean expression, with four minimal cut-sets, is 
chosen: 
TOP = + XgXg + X^Xg + Xg (17) 
where X^^, Xg, ...» Xg are the basic event unavailabilities, and TOP 
represents the system unavailability. The basic event unavailability 
data are obtained in terms of median and RF. For this example, the RF 
of each basic event is 3. The parameters of the lognormal distributions 
y and o are obtained from equations 2-4, and the mean is obtained from 
equation 6 (Table 1). 
The probability distribution of the TOP event unavailability is 
obtained by propagating the uncertainty of the basic events; the various 
percentile points are as follows: 
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Table 1. Basic event unavailability parameters for Example 1 
Component Median RF y a Mean 
0.001 3 -6.9078 0.6678 0.00125 
*2 0.03 3 -3.5066 0.6678 0.0375 
% 0.01 3 -4.6052 0.6678 0.0125 
0.03 3 -3.5066 0.6678 0.0375 
0.01 3 -4.6052 0.6678 0.0125 
X. 0.003 3 -5.8091 0.6678 0.00375 
5th percentile = 2.60 x lo 
median = 5.30 x 10 ^ 
mean = 5.96 % lO" 
95th percentile = 1.10 x 10 ^ 
The point estimate of the TOP event obtained by using median values from 
Table 1 in (Boolean) equation 17 is 4.6 x 10~^. The locations of the 
point estimate and the cumulative probability distribution of the TOP 
event for this example are shown in Figure 3. We notice that the point 
estimate actually represents the 36th percentile unavailability of the 
TOP event. The mean unavailability of the TOP event obtained by using 
«-3 
the mean unavailability of the basic event is 5.94 x lO , which, as 
expected from our discussions in the previous section, is about the 
same as obtained from the uncertainty propagation. The slight deviation 
in the mean obtained from Monte Carlo propagation may be attributed to 
the sampling error. 
6DIII PffiCENIIlE 5 9x 0 - O.C 
5.3:10 3 36lh FEACfNIIlE 
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lop Event Uiiavai laiiil i ty 
Figure 3. Cumulative probability distribution for TOP event unavailability for Example 1 
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Example 2. Simple Boolean Equation and Large Uncertainty 
in Basic Event Unavailability 
The Boolean expression from Example 1 is used here except that the 
RF for each basic event unavailability is changed from 3 to 10. The 
parameters w, a, and the mean for the basic event unavailability distribu­
tions are given in Table 2. The TOP event unavailability distribution is 
obtained by using Monte Carlo simulation; the various percentile points 
are as follows: 
5th percentile = 1.9 x lO" 
median = 8.5 % lo"^ 
mean = 1.4 % io~ 
95th percentile = 4.4 x lo ^ . 
The point estimate of the TOP event obtained by using median values for 
Table 2 in (Boolean) equation 17 is 4.6 x lO The location of the point 
estimate actually represents the 25th percentile unavailability of this 
example, as shown in Figure 4. We notice from the figure that the point 
Table 2. Basic event unavailability parameters for Example 2 
Component Median RF M a Mean 
0.001 10 -6.9078 1.3997 0.002663 
*2 0.03 10 -3.5066 1.3997 0.0799 
X3 0.01 10 -4.6052 1.3997 0.02663 
0.03 10 -3.5066 1.3997 0.0799 
x. 0.01 10 -4.6052 1.3997 0.02663 
0.003 10 -5.8091 1.3997 0.00799 
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Figure 4. Cumulative probability distribution for TOP event unavailability for Example 2 
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estimate actually represents the 25th percentile unavailability of the 
TOP event, and the mean value represents 71st percentile of the TOP 
event unavailability. 
Example 3. Moderately Complex Boolean Equation 
The following Boolean expression, with 16 minimal cut-sets, is 
chosen: 
TOP = AXg + AK + AE + XgXg + X^K + DX^ + DK + EX^ + BX^ 
+ X^X^ + CX^ + FB + BL + CL + FX^ + X^L . (18) 
The parameters of the basic event unavailability distributions are 
given in Table 3. The various percentile points for the TOP event 
unavailability distribution obtained by Monte Carlo are as follows: 
5th percentile = 2.2 x 10 ^  
-4 
median = 8.9 x lo 
mean = 1.5 % lO ^ 
95th percentile = 7.3 % lo"^ 
The cumulative unavailability distribution of the TOP event Is shown in 
Figure 5 along with the mean value and the point estimate obtained by 
using median values from Table 3. We notice that the point estimate 
and the mean represent the 15th and 72nd percentile values, respectively, 
of the TOP event unavailability distribution. 
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Table 3. Component unavailability for Boolean equation 18 
Component Median RF y a Mean 
A 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
X2 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
K 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
E 0.00283 1.96 -5.868 0.409 0.00295 
X3 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
D 0.00283 1.96 -5.868 0.409 0.00295 
B 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
^1 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
^4 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
C 0.00283 1.96 -5.868 0.409 0.00295 
F 0.00283 1.96 -5.868 0.409 0.00295 
L 0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
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Figure 5. Cumulative probability distribution for TOP event unavail­
ability for Example 3 
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Example 4. Complex Boolean Expression 
The following Boolean expression, with 86 minimal cut-sets, is 
chosen: 
TOP = AB + AC + BC + AD + BD + CD + BE + CE + DE + AF 
+ CF + DF + EF + AH + BH + DH + EH + FH + AI 
+ BI + CI + EI + FI + HI + JD + JI + KC + KH + LB 
+ LF + KL + MA + ME + JM + ND + NI + MN + PC 
+ PH + LP + QB + QF + KQ + PQ + RA + RE + JR 
+ NR + SB + SC + SD + SF + SH + SI + MS + RS + UA 
+ UC + UD + UE + UH + UI + LU + QU + SU + VA 
+ VB + VD + VE + VF + VI + KV + PV + SV + UV 
+ WA + WB + WC + WE + WF + WH + JW + NW + SW + UW + VW . (19) 
The parameters of component unavailability distributions are shown in 
Table 4. The various percentile points for the TOP event unavailability 
distribution obtained by Monte Carlo are as follows: 
Table 4. Component unavailability for Boolean equation 19 
A, B, C, 
D, E, F, 
H, I, J, 
K, L, M, 
S, U, V, 
Component Median RF o Mean 
W 
N, P, Q 
0.00553 8.10 -5.198 1.272 0.0124 
R 0.00283 1.96 -5.868 0.409 0.00295 
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5th percentile = 2.3 x lo 
median = 7.7 % 10 ^  
""2 
mean = 1.1 % lo 
95th percentile = 3.1 % 10 
The cumulative unavailability distribution of the TOP event Is shown In 
Figure 6 along with the mean value and the point estimate obtained by 
using median values from Table 4. 
We notice from Figure 6 that the point estimate and the mean repre­
sent the 6th and 70th percentile values, respectively, of the TOP event 
unavailability. 
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Figure 6. Cumulative probability distribution for TOP event unavailability for Example 4 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We would now determine whether the point estimates are representa­
tive of the central tendency of the TOP event distribution obtained by 
uncertainty propagation. 
A measure of the central tendency Is the cumulative probability 
associated with the point estimate values. The case studies presented 
in the Examples section range from simple Boolean expressions with four 
minimal cut-sets to a complex one with 86 minimal cut-sets. In all the 
cases, the point estimates based on the median values of the basic events 
are lower than the median obtained by uncertainty propagation. The 
point estimate shifts toward the lower tail of the distribution as the 
uncertainty in the basic event unavailability (represented by the range 
factor) increases or as the number of cut-sets increases. For the 
Boolean expression with 16 minimal cut-sets, the point estimate repre­
sents the 15th percentile of the TOP event distribution, and for the 
case with 86 cut-sets it represents only the 6th percentile. 
The point estimate obtained by using values of the basic event is 
the same as that obtained by uncertainty propagation. However, the 
mean values are higher than the median and represent about 70th per­
centile unavailability for the case studies. 
Based on the discussion above, we conclude that median values of 
the component failure data should not be used in risk assessments based 
on point estimates. The TOP event unavailability thus obtained can 
represent much lower values; i.e., the system would appear much better 
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than it actually Is. Therefore, special care Is warranted In the choice 
and analysis of component failure data, which generally have positively 
skewed distribution with a mean value greater than the median. It Is 
the mean value of the component failure that should be used for quantifi­
cation of the TOP event unavailability. This gives the mean value of 
the system unavailability. When comparing it with the RSS, it is again 
the mean value that should be compared. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Sections III and IV, certain aspects of risk quantification and 
its associated uncertainty have been described. The uncertainty 
propagation method in Section III combines the uncertainties in the 
failure probabilistics of all the basic events to quantify the 
uncertainty in the Top event (or system failure) frequency. However, 
as we gain nuclear power plant operating experience, the component data 
base will improve, and the uncertainties in the component failure rates 
are expected to decrease. Thus, in the light of more experience, the 
Top event failure probability distribution will be modified. 
Since experience with nuclear power plant (NPP) operations is 
limited, adequate failure histories of safety systems and the 
associated components are not available. The uncertainty in the 
component failure rates (as well as human error and common cause 
failure probabilities) is large. With large uncertainty in the basic 
parameters, the plant risk results obtained by using recent FRA methods 
may be less credible, because of lack of any sensitivity analysis of 
the uncertain parameters. 
Lacking a satisfactory data base, however, we need to devise 
methods that will identify the components that contribute most to the 
Top event failure probability and to the associated uncertainties. A 
particular difficulty is encountered when a risk being evaluated has 
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never been realized, e.g., large scale radioactivity release due to an 
accident in a nuclear power plant. In such cases, quantification of 
risk is highly dependent upon the adequacy of system modeling, the 
selection of all the significant ways in which accidents may happen, 
and the availability of failure data for the basic events (e.g., 
component failures and human errors). 
One serious drawback in PRA for nuclear power plants (NPPs) is 
that the results cannot be verified due to the absence of events and 
thus of data (e.g., frequency of core-melt). For the results to be 
acceptable and trustworthy, a plant specific PRA should therefore, 
produce results that are robust (i.e., insensitive) to various modeling 
assumptions and to the data base. Although a number of plant PRAs have 
been performed, sensitivity analysis or robustness of the results are 
generally not addressed. 
In this section we will first explore a Bayesian approach to 
analyzing the component failure rate data. The purpose of such an 
analysis will be to determine the sensitivity of the posterior failure 
rate distribution of a component based on the prior (or generic) 
failure rate distribution and the plant specific failure data. 
Having developed the failure rate data base, we shall next develop 
a sensitivity analysis approach to identify and rank those components 
that contribute significantly to the failure probability and to the 
uncertainty associated with the failure probability. The basis of 
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determining the relative ranking of the basic events pertaining to the 
NPP risk is the sensitivity of the Top event. The more sensitive the 
Top event is to a basic event or failure element, the greater is its 
risk contribution. A method is developed to quantify the sensitivity 
of the Top event by defining three different safety Significance 
Indices which assess the risk contribution of a basic event. The 
information obtained through the sensitivity analysis comprises a 
priority ranking of the basic events both with respect to the Mean 
value and the Variance of the failure probability. 
The methodology produces, as an additional product, the Mean and 
Variance of the Top event. Furthermore, the methodology has the 
capability to incorporate the variations in the basic event 
unavailability distribution and to establish the impact of such 
variations on the Top event. These variations in the probability 
distribution can be Introduced using the plant specific failure data 
through Bayesian updating model discussed on page 164. We will also 
devise an approach that will delineate the robustness of significance 
Indices, and present a method to perform sensitivity analysis using 
component significance indices. Examples will be presented to 
demonstrate the applications of the method. 
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DATA ANALYSIS OF BASIC EVENTS 
Introduction 
Bayes' theorem is being extensively used in recent plant PRAs 
[1-4] where quantitative assessment of a number of basic parameters 
(e.g., basic event unavailabilities) are made using subjective 
judgment. Although the use of expert opinion is unavoidable in PRA 
studies* and subjective interpretation of probability is being 
suggested as an appropriate format for analyzing risk from NPPs [5-10], 
the robustness of the PRA results is of special interest in this 
context. The conclusions of a plant PRA are considered robust if they 
do not change with alterations in the subjective formulations of the 
data base and with physical modeling used in the study. If the PRA 
results are unstable, i.e., they change with the subjective assessment 
of various parameters, then the conclusions are suspect, and require 
further scrutiny to assure their validity. 
The robustness criteria are of particular interest in preparing a 
failure rate data base for plant risk studies. In the absence of 
adequate failure data for a particular component (e.g., a valve) or an 
event (e.g., loss-of-offsite-power) for a specific NPP, a generic 
failure rate distribution, based on expert opinion and available field 
data, is subjectively assessed that encompasses different plants. This 
distribution, called the population variability curve of the component 
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(explained further in the next section), is updated by plant experience 
data, to develop a plant specific failure rate distribution (or the 
posterior distribution). To qualify the posterior distribution as 
valid, the following robustness criteria are desirable: 
1. The posterior distribution should be insensitive to the spread 
of the population variability curve. 
li. The posterior distribution should be insensitive to the type 
(lognormal, beta, or gamma) of population variability curve. 
The failure rate data base for a plant PRA that has the above two 
characteristics is defined here to be "a robust data base." 
Population Variability Curves 
The major data sources available for component failure and human 
errors are U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [11], IEEE Guide to the 
Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic and Sensing Com­
ponent Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generation Stations [13], Swain 
and Guttman [14], and Ahmed et al. [15]. Other data sources can also be 
used to supplement and enhance the quality of data for specific needs. 
However, a clear interpretation related to the physical process of data 
accumulation from the data sources in use is necessary. 
For a plant specific risk study, let us suppose that we are 
interested in the failure rates of a number of components. If the 
plant has been in operation for several years, we will have the failure 
history of the components. However, this failure history may be 
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insufficient, or nonexistent, if the plant has not started operation. 
A prediction of the component failure rates therefore, would be 
incomplete, and sometimes impossible to make, on the basis of plant 
experience itself. However, we have failure data available from the 
operating history of other nuclear power plants, for components of 
similar type (either from the same manufacturer or different 
manufacturers), and working under similar or different environments. 
Also, data on similar components are available from other related 
industries, such as fossil fueled electric power plants. This raises 
the question of uncertainty due to inadequate plant specific data. To 
put things into perspective, let us consider the following hypothetical 
experiments. 
Experiment I 
Let us consider m similar components (e.g., a pump) from the same 
population. We can define the population in several ways, such as (1) 
pumps from the same manufacturers, (2) similar pumps from different 
manufacturers but operating in a similar environment, e.g., in a power 
plant where it is subject to similar test and maintenance procedure, 
and operated by the same group of personnel. Whatever is the 
definition of the population, let us suppose we have the history of the 
time of failure of each of the m pumps. We can now obtain the 
mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) for each pump. Let us consider here 
that the end of the life MTBF of each pump is the same, and a constant 
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for the population under study. However, the observed data being 
incomplete (not end of life), MTBF for each pump will be different, and 
will form a probability distribution. Considering time to failure as 
exponentially distributed, the inverse of the MTBF is the parameter of 
the distribution which is also the failure rate or hazard function of 
the sample. This is then the generic failure rate distribution for the 
population, and our prior distribution for the population. This prior 
distribution can now be revised in the light of plant specific 
experience, i.e., the failure history of the pump for which we need the 
failure rate distribution. 
Experiment II 
Let us consider n different populations, each population having m 
similar components of interest (again, consider a particular type of 
pump) under study. The discussion in Experiment I is now valid for 
each of the n populations. We would now like to construct a generic 
distribution of the failure rate of the pump considering the failure 
history of all n populations. By extension of the logic in Experiment 
I, we would have the failure rate distribution of each population. It 
now remains to construct a composite prior distribution which accounts 
for the variability of n populations. Once this composite prior 
distribution is constructed, it can then be updated by the plant 
specific evidence of the pump failure, by employing Bayesian models. 
161 
However, the prior distribution that encompasses population variability 
is wider than the distribution of any one of the n populations. 
The above two postulated experiments are fundamental in relating 
the physical process of data accumulation to the statistical analysis 
that would follow. Here, we shall consider WASH-1400 as a source to 
derive a rationale for data analysis. 
The failure data base for the RSS included a number of sources 
that encompassed data from the nuclear industry (at that time the 
experience was 300 reactor-years) as well as other industries. Best 
estimate data was obtained for each source for the failure mode of the 
component of interest. Consider as an example, failure data for Motor 
Operated Valve (MOV) in Table III 2-1, Appendix III, WASH-1400 [11]. 
Point estimate data are given from different sources for various 
failure modes, such as failure to operate. From the data base, a lower 
5th percentile and upper 95th percentile bound were assessed, and a 
median value obtained considering the parameter to be lognormally 
distributed. 
The data base thus prepared for the risk study was considered to 
represent the uncertainty and the population variability of the 
parameter. To interpret the data we go back to Experiment II described 
earlier. Each of the data sources shown in the above cited table can 
be defined to represent a population, for which a point estimate 
represents a population, and for which a point estimate representing 
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the central tendency is given. It is not clear if the individual point 
estimates represent the median or the mean of the population. However* 
a probability distribution based on the point estimates are, in fact, 
distributions of the mean or median of the parameter, and not of the 
parameter itself. In risk studies, the parameters of interest are the 
failure rate or failure per demand, and we would like to have a 
probability distribution which would include uncertainty due to 
Insufficient experience data (Experiment I) as well as the population 
variability (Experiment II). The lower and the upper bounds assessed 
in the RSS are, therefore, those of the distribution of mean or median 
of the failure per hour or failure per demand. 
It now remains to infer the failure rate distribution from the 
distribution of mean or median failure rate. Unfortunately, it is not 
so straightforward using the RSS data base. We do not know the failure 
history of the components for the populations, the size of each 
population, etc. However, we know that the distribution of the 
parameter is much more spread out than the mean of the parameter, as 
shotm in Figure 1. Therefore, to obtain the desired distribution, we 
need to spread out the distributions given in the RSS. The question 
that arises is "how much should we spread the distributions given in 
the RSS so that it would reasonably represent the distribution of the 
population?" The answer to this question can be found empirically by 
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looking into the following implications of spreading out the failure 
distributions: 
1. RSS fits a lognormal distribution to the lower 5th percentile 
and the upper 95th percentile values. We shall investigate 
other fits such as gamma and beta distribution to notice the 
impact on the general shape of the distribution. 
2. The distributions in the RSS will be spread out and new values 
will be assigned to the lower 5th percentile and the upper 95th 
percentile points. Various different spreads will be 
considered; the RSS 90 percent confidence interval will be 
considered to represent 70, 60» and 50 percent confidence 
intervals for the distributions representing population 
variability of the parameters. Thus, the 5th and 95th (5/95) 
percentile points in RSS will represent 15th and 85th (15/85) 
percentile points of the population variability curve to 
represent 70 percent confidence interval, 20th and 80th (20/80) 
percentile points to represent 60 percent confidence interval, 
and 25th and 75th percentile points (25/75) to represent 50 
percent confidence interval. For each of these new confidence 
interval lognormal, gamma, and beta distribution fits will be 
considered in order to investigate the impact of the choice of 
the prior distributions. 
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Mean or Median in RSS 
CO 
a Desired Population 
Curve 
Log (Faiiure Rate) 
Figure 1, Distribution of the population failure rate vs. mean 
failure rate 
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3. Various prior distributions considered above will be updated by 
the plant specific information. Thus, the impact of the choice 
of the prior distribution representing various spreads upon the 
plant specific posterior distribution will be assessed. 
Bayesian Models 
Bayes theorem as an equation is written as 
ffX/E^ = f (X) L(E/X) 
= ^ 7(r)L(E7r)dr (i) 
where: 
f(X/E) = probability density function of X given the evidence E, 
called the posterior distribution, 
f(X) s probability density function of X, called the prior 
distribution, 
L(E/X) a probability of evidence E given the failure rate X, called 
the likelihood function. 
The likelihood function normally has two forms depending on the data base. 
If we have a data base of r failures in n trials, the likelihood function 
is the binomial distribution: 
L(E/X) =[°]X' (1-X)®"' (2) 
where: 
[J] = nî/[(n-r)!rî]. 
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In the other case where the data base is given as r failures over a 
fixed operational time T, the likelihood function is 
*XX IT 
L ( E / X )  =  - — ( P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n )  ( 3 )  
The integration in the denominator of equation 1 can be done 
analytically if we use conjugate functions. 
Gamma prior distribution 
If the prior distribution is modeled as a gamma density function 
of the form 
o-i .-ex 
° r<o) (4) 
where the parameters 3 and a are fixed by knowing the 5 and 95 
percentiles for A; i.e., 3 and a are found by solving the two equations: 
0.05 = f °^f(X)dX 
•o 
and 
rX 
1.95 = f ' 
•'o 
®^f(X)dX 
we now insert equations 3 and h into equation 1 to obtain the posterior 
function 
(e+lf e-(B+T)X 
f(X/E) = (5) 
We note that the posterior density function given by equation 5 can be 
obtained from equation 4 by replacing 3 with 3+T and a with a+r. 
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For the case of r failures in n trials where the failure rate (in 
failures per demand) is quite small» the binomial distribution can be ap­
proximated by the Poisson distribution. The final result can be obtained 
by replacing T in equation 3 with n to obtain the likelihood function 
where the units for X are failures per demand. This result is then 
used in equation 1 where the limits on the integral in the denominator 
are zero to one. For cases where most of the distribution is clustered 
near zero, the value of the integral is mainly determined by 
integrating from zero to one. We can obtain (with some slight error) 
the same form as equation 5 if we extend the integration from zero to 
infinity. The final result for the posterior density function is 
/«.-NO+r a+r-1 -(g+r)X 
r(«>r) (7) 
Beta prior distribution 
A more exact model for the failures per demand case is to use the 
beta distribution for the prior distribution. The normal range for the 
variable is then zero to one and this is given by 
>a-l f, .\b-l 
= B(a,b) . 0 < A < 1 (8) 
where a and b are parameters to be determined in a manner similar to 
the determination of B and a for the gamma distribution. The 
denominator in equation 8 is defined as 
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*(*'*) ° ^^ r(a+b)^^ (9) 
If equation 8 is now used in equation 1 along with the binomial likelihood 
function (equation 2), the integral in the denominator can be explicitly 
performed giving the posterior density function: 
^a+r—1 f. ^xb+n—r—1 
f(X/E) = B(a+r.'b+n-r) (10) 
We note again that this posterior function, equation 10, can be 
obtained from equation 8 by replacing a with a+r and b with b+n-r. 
Lognormal prior distribution 
The lognormal prior density function is given by 
One advantage of this density function is that the parameters X and a 
are easily determined from the and X^^ values as follows: 
U = I in (>05^5) (12) 
and 
1 ^5 
o = YI9 r~ 
^05 (13) 
If we consider the case of X failures per demand, then the likelihood 
function is given by equation 6, and the posterior density function is 
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,r—1 —XT— 1/2 [lnX-vi)/cT]^ 
f(VE) a V—2 2-
- X'T - 1/2 [in X' -y)/ol dX' 
Jo (A ' ® (14) 
An Innediate disadvantage of this method is that the denominator in 
equation 14 cannot be performed explicitly but requires a numerical 
integration. 
Example 
A number of case studies were conducted to obtain generalized 
results for deriving plant specific population variability curves. For 
better understanding an example calculation will be shown here to 
illustrate the procedure. 
The 5th and 95th percentile values from RSS for MOV failure to 
operate (3 x 10"^/D and 3 x 10"^/D» respectively) are used to fit 
lognormal* gamma and beta distributions. Those distributions are 
further expanded such that the 5th/95th percentile values represent 
15/85, 20/80, and 25/75 percentile values for each type of distri­
bution; these are the set of prior distributions shown in Figure 2, 
which are made plant specific by the use of plant specific history of 
MOV failures by using Bayes' theorem. The lognormal priors are sharply 
peaked while the gamma and beta priors are diffused. Also, the gamma 
and beta priors are almost identical. Postulated plant specific 
evidences are now used to ascertain the sensitivity of the posterior 
distributions. The class of evidences found useful are 5 failures in 
1000 demands (5/1000), (1/100), and (1/10). The conjugate likelihood 
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functions used to arrive at the plant specific posterior distributions 
are Poisson distribution for the lognormal and gamma priors « and 
binomial likelihood for beta priors. The Bayes' theorem formulation 
and the associated computer code BURD (Bayesian Updating of Reliability 
Data) used here are given in References [15] and [16]> 
The resultant posterior distributions related to lognormal and 
gamma priors are shown in Figures 3 through 6. The posterior 
distributions for the beta priors are almost identical with the gamma 
posteriors, and are not presented here. To facilitate comparison, the 
mean and median values for all the prior and posterior distributions 
shown in Figures 3 through 6 are provided in Table 1. 
Results 
Strong evidence 
For a standby component the evidence can be said to be strong if 
the specific experience in the neighborhood of 1000 demands or more are 
available. As can be seen in Figure 3 the posterior distribution with 
strong evidence is insensitive (robust) with respect to the spread 
(5/95, 15/85, or 25/75) and type (lognormal, gamma, or beta) of the 
prior distribution. However, gamma prior with the conjugate Poisson 
likelihood function is found to be preferable for the following reasons: 
# Mathematical convenience for Bayesian updating. Here the 
posterior is also a gamma distribution with revised parameters. 
• Computational ease of computer evaluation of the parameters of 
gamma distribution given the 5th and 95th percentile values. 
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# Beta posterior distributions obtained by using conjugate beta 
priors and binomial likelihood functions are very similar to 
the conjugate gamma posteriors for the range of failure rates 
encountered in risk assessment (computationally parameters of 
beta distributions are difficult to obtain, given the 5th and 
95th percentile values). 
• Shape of gamma distributions are more flexible and diffused as 
compared to lognormal distributions which have sharper peaks 
for the same 5th and 95th percentile values. 
Moderately strong evidence 
The failure history for a component can be said to be moderately 
strong, if the evidence (number of failures) in the neighborhood of 100 
demands or more (but much less than 1000 demands) are available. As 
can be seen in Figure 4, the posterior distribution has the following 
two characteristics: 
1. It is moderately sensitive (less robust as compared to the case 
of strong evidence) to the spread of the prior distribution. 
2. It is less sensitive to the type of prior distribution. 
As observed earlier, we notice that lognormal priors produce sharper 
and less diffused posterior distributions. 
Weak evidence 
The evidence is considered as weak if the observed experience for the 
component is of the order of 10 demands (e.g., 1 failure in 10 demands). 
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Table 1. Prior and posterior distribution mean and median* values 
for various types (lognormal, gamma, and beta) and spread 
of prior distribution for different plant specific evidences 
Spread 
Lognormal^ 
Prior 
Posterior. 
5/1000° 1/100 1/10 0/10.000 
5/95* 1.2x10"^ 1x10'^ 1.6x10"^ 1.6x10-3 2.7x10-4 
(9.5x10"*) (8x10"^) (1.2x10-3) (1.4x10-3) (2.5x10-4) 
15/85® 1.8x10"^ 4xl0"3 3.3x10-3 5.5x10-3 1.6x10-4 
(9.5x10"*) (3.7x10"^) (2.3x10-3) (3.1x10-3) (1.3x10-4) 
20/80^ 2.4x10"^ 4.3x10"^ 4.4x10-3 1.1x10-2 1.2x10-4 
(9.5x10"^) (4xl0~^) (2.9x10-3) (5.3x10-3) (1x10-4) 
25/75® -4.9x10"^ 4.5x10"^ 5.6x10-3 2x10-2 9.5x10-5 
tA.9x10"^) (4.2x10'^) (3.6x10-3) (9.7x10-3) (7.1x10-5) 
^The median values are given in parentheses. 
bonly prior is a lognormal distribution. 
^Evidence 5 failures in 1000 demands. 
dprior 5th percentile = 3xlO~^/D and 95th percentile = 3xlO"3. 
Gprior 5th percentile = l.SxlO~^/D and 95th percentile = 6xlO"3. 
fPrior 5th percentile = lxlO"4/D and 95th percentile = 9x10*3. 
SPrior 5th percentile = 6xlO~^/D and 95th percentile = 1.5x10"%. 
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Gamma/Beta 
Posterior 
Soread Prior 5/1000* 1/100 1/10 0/10.000 
5/95® 1.3x10"^ 
(1.2x10"^) 
6.3x10"* 
(6x10-4) 
1.8x10-3 
(1.6x10-3) 
1.9X10"3 
(1.7x10-3) 
2.1x10-* 
(1.8x10"*) 
15/85* 2.1x10'^ 
(1.5x10"*) 
4x10-3 
(3.8x10-3) 
3.3x10*3 
(2.8x10-3) 
3.9X10-3 
(3.3x10-3) 
1.1x10-* 
(8x10-*) 
20/80® 2.9x10"^ 
(1,9x10"^) 
4.5x10-3 
(4.2x10-3) 
4.6x10-3 
(3.8x10-3) 
6x10-3 
(4.9X10-3) 
8.4x10-5 
(5.5x10-5) 
25/75^ 5.0x10"^ 
(5x10'^) 
4.9x10-3 
(4.6x10-3) 
6.6x10-3 
(5.3x10-3) 
1x10"^ 
(8.2x10-3) 
6.5x10-5 
(3.6x10-5) 
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It can be observed from Figure 5 that the posterior distribution is 
highly unstable and depends strongly upon the spread and the type of 
the population variability curve. 
Conclusions 
In some of the recent plant risk studies (e.g., Refs. 1, 2, and 4) 
the prior or generic distributions have been assessed using the 
available data sources and then they are spread out arbitrarily without 
studying the sensitivity of the spread or choice of the type of 
distribution. However, this study reveals that the failure data base 
for plant FRA from the Bayesian viewpoint can be developed without 
resorting to highly subjective arguments in formulating the component 
failure rate distributions. The criteria on acceptability should be 
the robustness of the posterior distribution, which is true when the 
experience data is significant. The development of the plant model 
(e.g., fault trees), therefore, is linked to the availability of 
component failure data, to the extent that the posterior failure rate 
distributions of the components are likelihood dominated. The results 
of the sensitivity analysis explored here will provide a basis for 
developing posterior distributions of the basic events for use in PRA. 
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SIGNIFICANCE INDICES FOR COMPONENT RANKING 
To develop a ranking of critical components of a large system, we 
will define three significance indices and see if the significance 
indices are robust with respect to the basis event failure probability 
distributions. 
In general, the failure probability or frequency of a system failure 
can be expressed in terms of the component failure probabilities as 
follows [17]: 
0,1 a, o 
In equation 15, are n-component probabilities or frequencies, 
P is The Top-level (system-level) probability and A, , are 
L(X« • • *0, J 
o X n 
(2-1) coefficients with values 0, 1, or -1 which are characteristic of 
the fault tree considered. The expression in equation 15 corresponds 
directly to a fault tree or system block diagram. 
Equation IS as an algebraic representation offers certain 
advantages. It expresses for each probability P^(m=l...n) in terms of 
the Top-level probability P as: 
' - (16) 
From equation 16 one can obtain: 
Hi-i" 
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and 
p , A*!)? A"" 
(in,) 
where is defined as the Significance Index of component m. 
Equations 17a and 17b represent the sentivities of the Top-level 
tree (system failure event) with respect to the probabilities of the 
components. The parameters in equation 17b measure directly the percent 
changes in the Top-level probability due to a certain specified 
percentage change in the component probability. As such, equation 17b is 
used to define a measure of importance for the component under 
examination. Equation 17a can be used directly to calculate the changes 
in the Top-level probability as the component probability changes. 
From equation 17a it can be seen that as 0, i.e., 
component m appears in few sequences, -+ 0. Furthermore, from 
equation 17b as 0, i.e., the element m approaches nonfailure, 
S 0. In addition, as A ->• 0, S -»• 1. This is the limit when 
m mm
component m appears in all sequences. It is, therefore, appropriate to 
define as the significance index for the element m. It is to be 
noted from equations 17a and in» that is dimensionless and ranges 
from 0 (least significant) to 1 (most significant). measures the 
importance of the element m in terms of the number of sequences it is 
associated with and the relative strength of such associations. Insofar 
as equations 16, 17a and 17b visibly exhibit the role that a specified 
element plays in the structure of the Top-level probability, the present 
approach can be judged to be an explicit formulation of the problem. 
182 
Historically* point estimate methods were used to calculate the 
frequency of a Top event, e.g., failure of a complex system. Since the 
experience base is not extensive, large uncertainties in the component 
failure rate estimates exist. It was, therefore, recognized that such 
failure rates needed to be modeled as probability distributions rather 
than point values. The modeled uncertainties can then be propagated to 
yield the uncertainty of the Top event. 
The mean F and variance o for the Top-level probability are first 
obtained in terms of component mean P and variance It is 
m lu 
then possible to define three significance indices by the three partial 
derivatives as follows: 
- 4^^" r % 
"  ^1#  ^
s(3). îi 
" So? (18) 
The three Indices above measure, respectively, the percentage changes in 
the Top level: (I) mean with respect to i^t percentage change in 
component mean, (2) variance with respect to unit percentage change in 
component mean, and (3) variance with respect to unit percentage change 
in component variance. If any one of these dimenslonless indices has a 
relatively high value, the element can be judged to be potentially 
important. 
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Quantification of Significance Indices 
Here, methods are developed to quantify the three Significance 
Indices. The equations for the Mean and Variance of the Top event arè 
first formulated and then appropriate partial derivatives with respect to 
the basic event (or failure element) Mean and Variance are evaluated to 
quantify the Significance Indices. 
Top event mean and variance 
For a given Fault Tree, the Top level probability F is given in 
terms of component probabilities p^ (all considered point values for 
the time being) by equation 15 repeated here for convenience. 
0,1 o- a 
- P" I Af. ...a 1 "...P, 
*l"'*n 
(15) 
Although equation 15 is strictly true for a Fault Tree, it can be used 
for an Event Tree or a Fault Tree-Event Tree mix by generalizing the 
Top event appropriately. The coefficients ^ j in equation 15 
are characteristic values dependent on the logic of the Fault Tree. It 
can take on values of 0, 1 or -1; the nonzero values occur if and only 
if the set a^...a^ corresponds to a Sequence or Grossterm. For 
example, if {1,2} and {1,3} are two viable sequences with chain length 
2 each, then 
*[110000...] ® *[101000] ° * 
Furthermore, the crossterm between these two sequences is obtained by 
the set theoretic union of the sequence elements. Thus, the crossterm 
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corresponds to 
{1,2} U {1.3} = {1.2,3} . 
It is seen that this term has a chain length 3. Additionally, the 
algebraic rules for compositions are such that the crossterms obtained by 
"uniting" two sequences have a value -1. those with three, +1. and so 
on. Thus, in the example considered: 
As the chain length (including Sequences and Crossterms) grows bigger, 
the corresponding terms in equation 15 become smaller and involve a 
multiplication of a larger number of F's. Hence, it is efficient to 
truncate the process for a specified value of chain length 
defined to be the maximum number of failure elements that participate in 
an accident sequence for the Fault tree under consideration. 
Since the component unavailabilities are more realistically 
represented by probability distributions rather than point estimates, it 
is necessary to consider their probability distribution function (PDF), 
fm(i). for values The input probability distributions are 
discretized with the techniques outlined on Page 198. From equation 15 
the first moment of the Top level probability is obtained as follows: 
*[111000...] ° ^ 
^ i 'l(ij)***'n(i^) *'l(i^)**-*'n(i^) *[aj...a^] 
(19) 
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Again, the second moment of the Top level probability is given by* 
f 0.1 ^ 
. (2)  1-^11 0.1 a^4ci' 
1^.7.1,a;.:..,; 'kv «a»/"'naj I 
X A 
Oil 0 1 
a....a a'...a* X n 1 n 
(20) 
Here, each probability distribution is discretized into 11 cells (the 
discretization procedure is described later in the subsection entitled, 
"Sensitivity Analysis Using Significance Indices"). 
From equations 19 and 20, the variance of the Top level 
probabilities is given by: 
0,1 0.1 
.,1. .:.L/ki-V '["i—A] 
1 n 1 n 
(21) 
The equations 19 and 21 can then be used to calculate the Mean and 
Variances of the Top level probability in terms of the first and second 
moments of the component and the coefficients A 
•. .ot 1 1 n 
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Calculation of significance indices 
Let us consider a system X consisting of components A, B, and C, 
where B and C are in parallel and A in series as given by the following 
block diagram 
B 
A 
C 
Then, the probability of system failure can be written as 
P* = P. + PsPo - PaPbPc b*^c 
2;Pa + PbPc 
where p^» p^« and p^ are the probabilities of failures for A, B, 
Cf respectively, and the product term is negligible. It 
is also- assumed that the failure events are independent of each other. 
Let the distributions p^, p^^, and p^ be given in the discrete 
form as in the following figure. 
1 
0.7 
0.3 
0.6 
0.4 
,-3 10 " 10 
"a 
-2 
0.8 
I 
0.2 
10^ 10 
Pw 
r3 10 -2 10 -1 
1S7 
We can readily calculate the following expectation, to te used in 
later calculations. 
• (10'^)(0.3) + (10"^)(0.7) • 7.3 X 10~3 , 
^ . (10-3)2 (0.3) + (10"2)* (0.7) B 7.03 x 10'^ . 
Similarly: 
^ = 6.4 X 10"^, Py a 6.04 X 10'^ 
p^ « 8.2 X 10"*, Pg = 8.02 X 10"3 . 
Also, the variances are obtained as 
*a " »! - (Pa)' 
- 7.03 X lO'S . (7.3 X 10"3)2 
- - 1.701 X 10"? 
oj - 1.944 X 10"^ 
- 0* = 1.296 X 10"3 . 
c 
For the system failure, 
w mt 
p^ » Pa + PyPg = 7.35 X 10" Mean 
fl • (Pa • - Pa * 'Wc + Pb^c 
2 2 n" 2 2 
Px 1 Pa + ^ PaPbPc + PfaPc 
« 7.11 X lO'S 
i " Px - Px 
o 7.11 X 10"* . (7.35 X 10-3)2 
« 1.71 X 10"^ Variance . 
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Then, the first significance index is calculated as follows: 
P% " Pa + Vc 
3P- 9Px .9 -4 
3p^ • . Pg . 8.2 X 10 , 5|- = p^^ o 6.4 X 10 
CI) Pa ^Px * 10"^ 
B (1) m 0.9932 
® Px ®Pa 7.35 X 10": 
. Î&  = 8.14 X 10~* 
b Pjj apy 
s(l) o = 7.14 X 10"3 
C SPg 
To obtain the second and third significance indices, we first obtain 
the expression of the Top event variance as follows: 
Writing the second moments in terms of variance and first-moment as: 
0 = "!* a/ 
^ = »b * Gb»* 
Pc - "c • ( f / '  
we can obtain the expression of the Top event variance as 
"l - 'a * (°b * V) "c • - ih\'' 
(21) 
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Then, the second significant indices can be obtained from equation 21 
as follows: 
'Pa 
"5^ • 2 Pfc (o? • p^) - - 1.659 % 10-* 
3JJ2 
IT " (°b + 'c - 3-1»* * 10'* 
• % 5^ " *'209 * 10"' 
»Pb 
^ 5^ " 1-52' * 10"* 
Further» the third significance indices are obtained from 
equation 20, as follows: 
da J" 
5*" 
. 2 
o (p^ + p^) e 8.02 X 10"^ 
acyZ G c 
. 2 
. (aJ + pj) = 6.04 X 10"^ 
30 c 
gO). Zâ j£| = 0.9947 
a o 2 30 2 
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si"- ^  % .*.58x10-5 
The first, second, and third significance indices are provided, for 
convenience, in Table 2. 
Table 2. Significance Indices obtained for the example calculations for 
Px = Pa + PbPc where Pg, py, Pgt and p^ are the failure 
probability distributions for the components a, b, c, and the 
system x, respectively 
First Second Third 
Significance Significance Significance 
Index Index Index 
~ - (1) (2) (3) 
Component SQ, S^ SQ 
k- 0.9932 0 0.9947 
B 8.14 X 10-2 6.21 x 10-5 9.12 x 10-5 
C 7.14 X 10-3 1.53 X 10-4 4.58 x 10-5 
It should be made clear that the Significance Indices do not 
distinguish between the importance of the component due to its location 
in the system (structural importance) and the importance of the component 
due to its high failure rate (reliability importance). Thus, a component 
having relatively low failure rate (or a good design) may have a high 
Significance Index if its location in the system does not have 
redundancy. In this case, it is not the design of the component that 
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needs Improvement; rather, redundancy Is required to lower the Signifi­
cance Index of the component. The Significance Index may also be high 
due to high failure rate of the component. In this case, design im­
provement as well as redundancy will help to reduce the Significance 
Index of the component. Further research is, therefore, required to 
apportion the Significance Indices developed here to distinguish between 
the structural importance and the reliability importance. 
Robustness of Significance Indices 
The Significance Indices of a component in a system depend upon the 
failure probability distribution of the component. Actually, as we will 
see in this section, the Significance Indices of the rest of the compo­
nents in the system model may also vary due to the variation in the fail­
ure probability distribution of the component. This warrants us to 
Investigate the impact of various assumptions in the failure probability 
distributions of the basic events on the ranking of the system compo­
nents. Recalling that the ranking of the components is based on their 
Significance Indices, we would like to observe the modified Significance 
Indices based on various assumptions of the basic event probability 
distributions. 
Considering that one objective of a plant PRÂ is to develop a rank­
ing of components in order of their Impact on plant safety (e.g., fre­
quency of core melt), we would also like to analyze how sensitive Is such 
a ranking on the assumptions of the basic event probability distributions. 
If the component ranking does not vary significantly, then the PRA results 
are defined here as being robust. The method for robustness analysis as 
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related to the Significance Index is described here. Let us define an 
index: 
where: 
0^ = significance of the mth element due to change induced 
in the kth element 
« mean probability of kth element 
S B first significance index of mth element. 
Since S_ fa _âi 
m P 3P, m 
rê m 
Pfc 
'"m-s; 
_9jL 
|_p sPm p2 Pk aPm t aVPkj 
X i_ 5ê âL.  Ms-+ Ms 
km Sm P 9Pm S p^ ^Pk ^Pm V ^m^Pk 
where 
is the Kronecker Delta function such that 
6^ = 1 when k = m 
= 0 when k ^  m 
For k = m; 
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Tenn • i- |s 
D m 
• L 
• 1, by definition 
when k m: 
1st Term « 0 
2nd Term 
Hence, 5-5-
Thus» 
®mk " ®km ' ®k 
B 1 - Sjj • when k = m 
(22) 
(23) 
% 
"-"k+ 
Calculations of robustness analysis 
Let us consider a system with elements 1» 2, 3* 4, such that the 
mean system failure probability is given by 
P = Pi + P2P3 + P2P4 
Let us assume that the first significance indices are 
s 0*8$ ^ 0#8$ Sg 3 0#2# and 5 0*6 # 
From the definition, we notice that 
Si « p . Sj - _ hh ^ , and ^ . 
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Then, from equation 23 we write: 
»ll e 1 - S i  B 0.2 
=12 0 -
a CM 
CO 
0.8 
"13 
8 - 83 = 0.2 
»U 8 - S4 = 0.6 
=21 - Sl = - 0.8 
=22 8 -
II CM 
CO 
0.2 
P2P3 S, 
"23 • - • S^f S3 + 5; " O-OS 
P2P4 ®4 
°2ft • - ®4 • pS^ = "•' • * 0-lS 
Djj • — Sj « — 0.8 
PgPg 
®32 • " ®2 * psT • 
®33 " - S3 = - 0.2 
®34 = 1
 
H 
— 0.6 
®41 " - Si = — 0.8 
P2P4 
®M • - ^2 • P7 ° 
D^2 " - Sg = — 0*2 
« I - « 1 - 0.6 B 0.4 
If we introduce 100% change in component k, i.e., (Sp^/p^) = 1, then 
„ Pu»s„ (as„/5„) ^ 
"to ° " Op^/p^) " 
Hence, 3S^ « . 
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Hence, the significance index for component m after introducing a 
change in component k is given by 
®m " • Vicm " ®B " * 
Let us suppose that we induce 100% change in components 1, 2, 3, and 
4, one at a time, and observe how the significance indices for each 
component change. We begin with a 100% change in the probability of 
component 1. 
Then, 
and Si = (1 + 
00 0
 0 (1 + 0.2) = 0. 96 
< ? S: (1 + = 0.8 (1 - 0.8) e 0. 16 
1^3 « S3 (I + Dg^) 
= 0.2 (1 - 0.8) B 0.04 
• f 
-
= S4 (1 + a 0.6 (1 - 0.8) = 0. 12 
Similarly, for Apg/Pg = 1 
1 
=1 
t 
= 0.26, S2 = 0.96, S3 = 0.24, 
I 
S4 a 0.72 
For AP3/P3 • 1 
# t 
= 0.64, Sg = 0.84, 
1 
«3 s 0.36, S4 s 0.48 
For AP4/P4 = 1 
t 
Si ® 0.32, $2 ® 1. 
t 
S3 s 0.08, 
1 
S4 <s 0.84 
We can now observe the ranking of the components due to changes in­
duced in their probability of failure. Thus, prior to any changes in the 
failure probabilities, the ranking was (1, 2, 3, 4) or (2, 1, 3, 4), 
obtained from the significance of component ranking upon changes in the 
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component failure probabilities as given in Table 3. Notice that the 
component ranking does not change even if we induce significant changes 
in the component failure probabilities. The results of the reliability 
analysis (in this case the ranking of the components 1* 2, 3, A) are, 
therefore, robust for this example, insofar as the dominant contributors 
to system unavailability remain the same. The corrective actions to 
reduce system unavailability (by reducing the probability of component 
failures), therefore, do not depend in this case upon the failure 
probabilities; rather, they are dependent upon the structure or the way 
the components are arranged in the system. 
The approach presented above, therefore, provides a mechanism to 
analyze robustness of FRÂ results. 
Table-3. Study of robustness for sample problem, p = + PgPg + 
100% First Significance Index for Elements 1. 2. 3. 4 
Change 
In Sx S2 S3 S4 Ranking 
PI 0.96 0.16 0.04 0.12 1, 2, 4, 3 
P2 0.26 0.96 0.24 0.72 2, 4, 1, 3 
P3 0.64 0.84 0.36 0.48 2, 1, 4, 3 
P4 0.32 1.0 0.08 0.84 2, 4, 1, 3 
Prior to Change Induced 1, 2, 4, 3 
or 
2, 1, 4, 3 
Ranking After Introducing Changes in Component Probabilities 
Ist: Elements 1 and 2 
2nd: Element 4 
3rd: Element 3 
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Comparison with Other Measures of Importance 
A number of importance measures have been defined in the literature 
pertaining to reliability and risk assessment. A brief comparison of the 
Significance Indices developed here will be made with other measures of 
importance. 
The Significance Index 1, S^ , is an improvement over the 
Birnbaum measure of importance, and is the same as the Upgrading Function 
defined by Lambert [18]. Fussell importance [19] measures the 
percentage contribution of a component or a cut-set to the Top event 
probability but does not provide the improvement in the Top event 
probability due to certain improvement in a basic event. Other measures 
of importance of interest could be Barlow-Proschan basic event and 
cut-set importance [20] (or the steady state Barlow-Proschan importance 
[20]-^ ; they provide the expected number of Top event failures due to a 
basic event or cut-set failure in time 0 to t (or probability of Top 
event at steady state). From the point of view of applications, we find 
the Upgrading Function or to be the most appropriate measure of 
importance which provides fractional change in the Top event mean due to 
fractional change in a basic event or cut-set mean probability. 
It should be noted that the set of three importance measures used 
here addresses first and second moments rather than the first moment 
only. As such, the proposed definition goes beyond identifying 
importance in terms of the point-estimates and covers the sensitivity of 
the Top event failure probability due to uncertainty in the component 
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failure rates. It is interesting to note that Vicki Bier [21] at NIT 
has also defined, independently, an importance measure involving second 
moments, which is the same as the Significance Index 3. The 
Significance Indices 2 and 3 provide the informational needs for 
scatter in component failure data, i.e., they identify the basic events 
which significantly contribute to the uncertainty of the Top event. 
Sensitivity Analysis Using Significance Indices 
We have analyzed the robustness of the system reliability results 
to see how the ranking of the dominant components changes if the mean 
failure probability of the components is changed. For a simple 
example, we have observed that the ranking does not change. However, 
even if-the ranking may not change, the system failure probability may 
be sensitive to the changes in the component failure probabilities. To 
analyze how sensitive is the system failure probability distribution 
upon the variations in the component failure probability distributions, 
the following approach is proposed. 
Suppose for a complex system of interest the mean and variance of 
the system failure probability have been obtained through a system 
model (fault tree/event tree) and basic event (or component) failure 
probability data base. We would now like to observe the changes in the 
system failure probability mean and variance due to changes in each of 
the component failure probability distributions (specifically, the mean 
and variance). 
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Let us assume that the basic event failure probability distribu­
tions are lognormally distributed and the 5th and 95th percentile 
values are and respectively. Then, if the distribution on 
the logarithmic scale is discretized such that: 
log p,Q - log p. 
log = log Pj^  + (i-1) g for i = 1, 2,...11, (24) 
Then, it can be shown that the cell probabilities are as follows: 
Assigned the probability to 
p i  
p 2  
p 3  
p 4  
p 5  
p 6  
p ?  
H . 
p 9  
plo 
pll 
From equation 24 we can write: 
pi = pl(plofpl) ' 
(1=1) 
Let Pio^ Pi ® ' • then p^  = p^ r 9 
The mean and variance of the distribution can then be written as 
11 n (^ )^ 
Cell Probability, f 
1 0.050 
2 0.050 
3 0.080 
4 0.110 
5 0.135 
6 0.150 
" 7. 0.135 
8 0.110 
 ^ 9 0.080 
-.10 0.050 
- 11 0.050 
'-'1 j/ (25) 
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and 
«  I p i  f i  -
1=1 
1=1 ^ (26) 
where p is given by equation 25. 
Thus, given the 5th (p^ ) and 95th (p^ g) percentile values of a 
basic event failure probability, and assuming a lognormal distribution, 
the mean and variance can be obtained from equations 25 and 26, 
respectively. 
Let us. now induce a change in the basic event distribution through 
the following mechanism. Keeping the p.'s the same, we shall change 
f^ 's -such that 
Afi = f^  (27) 
This means that for p^ ^^  (1 = 11), we are inducing a 100% increment 
in the probability. For i = 7 to 10, f^ 's increase, f^  = 0 for 1 = 
6, and f^ 's decrease for 1 = 1 to 5, such that 
11 
I «i - 0 , 
1=1 1 
generating a bonafide probability distribution. The purpose of such an 
automated mechanism to induce variations in the failure probability 
distribution is to study the sensitivity of the system failure 
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probability upon the high frequency tails of the basic event 
distributions (which stems from a lack of adequate data for some of the 
components). 
As an example* let us consider a distribution with the 5th percen­
tile value as p^  and (Pig/Pi) = r = 10. Then, from equation 25 we 
can obtain 
After introducing changes in the distribution according to equation 
27 the variations in the mean and variance are calculated, and are 
The impact of such a distribution upon the Top event can now be 
calculated in terms of the significance indices. 
From the definition, the percentage change in the Top event mean due 
to changes in the component mean is given by 
Also, percentage change in Top event variance due to percentage 
change in the basic event variance Is given by 
mean p_ = 4.45 p. 
m 1 
and variance, from equation 26 is 
<^ m^  = 9.04 p2. 
and 
(28) 
(29) 
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We can also calculate the total percentage change in the Top event 
mean and variance due to changes in all or a group of components as 
p I py (30) 
^ • 1 c f) (31) 
where 
= first significance index for component j, j=l, 2...k 
ID J 
( 2 )  
S^ j = second significance index for component j, j=l, 2...k 
Pj = mean probability of failure for component j 
- Pj = changes induced in the mean probability of failure for 
- component j 
Thus* for the given example * if = 0.8* and = 0.6* then 
the percentage change in the Top event mean and variance are 
(^ ) = (0.8) (0.327) = 0.26 or 26% 
" 2 
= (0.6) (0.327) = 0.20 or 20% 
a 
Summary and Conclusions 
The frequency of the sequence of events* leading to the top event* 
e.g.* core degradation or simply a system unavailability* is sensitive to 
some of the basic events (e.g.* random failure of components * human 
errors* and test and maintenance). We would like to identify those basic 
events and rank them in order of importance to their contribution to the 
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top event. An important aspect of the component ranking is its sensi­
tivity upon uncertainty characteristics of the basic event probabilities. 
We have investigated two related problems in arriving at a ranking of 
components for a system: (1) sensitivity of the basic event probability 
distribution under various modeling assumptions of the prior distri­
bution; and (2) sensitivity of the ranking of the components upon 
uncertainty characteristics of the basic events. 
It was found that when using subjective interpretation of 
probability and Bayes* theorem, full awareness of the interpretation and 
sensitivity of the posterior distribution upon the choice of prior 
distribution and likelihood function is essential. The plant model, such 
as fault trees, should be defined such that the posterior distribution of 
the basic events is likelihood-dominated. Some of the empirical 
observations in this paper will help in developing data bases that are 
relatively less sensitive to the choice of the prior distributions. In 
cases where the posterior distribution is unstable, a sensitivity 
analysis and adequate rationale for arriving at the posterior 
distribution must be developed. The posterior distribution becomes 
highly sensitive when the evidence is in the form of zero failures in n 
demands; in such cases, special care is warranted in the formulation of 
the prior distribution. 
To develop ranking of basic events which contribute significantly to 
the mean and uncertainty of the top level event probability, we defined 
three measures of importance (or Significant Indices) which are: 
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1. Percent change In Top Level Mean Induced due to a unit percent­
age change in the basic event Mean. 
2. Percent change in Top Event Mean due to a unit percent change 
of the basic event Variance. 
3. Percent change in Top Event Variance due to a unit percent 
change of the basic event Variance. 
The inputs required to find the three safety indices are the logic models 
(Event Trees/Fault Trees or the Minimal Cut Sets), and the probability 
distribution of the unavailability of each basic event. The method con­
sists of formulating appropriate multilinear expressions of the Mean and 
Variance of the Top event—in terms of the mean and variance of the basic 
events. We then obtain the partial derivatives of the Top Event Mean and 
Variance with respect to the Mean and Variance of the basic events which 
in tarn yield the values of three Significance Indices for each basic 
event. The output of the method is a ranking of the basic events based 
on the corresponding Significance Indices. 
A method is devised to analyze the sensitivity of the component 
ranking upon the basic event probability distribution model. Since the 
component ranking is based on the Significance Indices, variations in the 
Significance Indices of the components are obtained due to variations in 
the component failure probability distributions. If the new set of Sig­
nificance Indices does not warrant a substantial change in the ranking of 
the components, then the FRÂ results are defined here as robust. If the 
component ranking is very sensitive to the basic event failure distribu­
tion models, then the PRA results are not considered as robust. 
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An important feature of the Significance Indices is the convenience 
of finding the percentage variations of the mean and variance of the top 
event due to single or multiple variations in the mean and variance of 
one or more basic events in the system model. Thus, the Significance 
Indices provide a simplistic method for performing sensitivity analysis 
of system failure probability due to improvement such as design changes 
or deterioration (due to component aging) of the components. 
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SUGGESTIONS 
In the course of performing the study In Section V, It became 
apparent that the sensitivity analysis approach can be expanded to 
Investigate other Issues In PRÂ. Two such areas of potential exten­
sion are dependent failure analysis and uncertainty propagation. The 
concepts of the extensions will be presented here as suggestions for 
further research. The two cases considered here are: 
1. Sensitivity analysis approach to rank dependent failures. 
2. Informational needs for uncertainty propagation. 
Sensitivity Analysis Approach to Rank 
Dependent Failures 
Although qualitative approaches to Identify important Dependent 
1  
Failures through computer-aided manipulation of Fault Trees exist, a 
ranking among all the Common cause candidates is difficult to achieve. 
The currently available parametric quantification procedures can, at 
best, quantify isolated cases of Dependent Failure events. The 
limitations of scope and the data requirement do not allow the exist­
ing techniques to yield a quantitative ranking of the Common Cause 
candidates easily. However, the need obviously exists for such a 
ranking so that the significance of the CCFs can be understood and 
T^he terminologies Common Cause Failures (CCF) and Dependent 
Failures have been used here interchangeably. 
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assessed. In what follows, an approach is formally presented to 
quantify the sensitivity of the Top event on the Dependent Failure 
candidates utilizing techniques similar to the one in the main report. 
The method uses the system Fault Tree developed to a level such that 
component failure susceptibility due to Common Causes are identified 
and quantified. The identification part can be done with some of the 
available codes such as COMCAN (!)« BACFIRE (2), and WAMCOM (3), with 
little or no modifications. The procedure is to obtain the combination 
of component failure elements or basic events (Minimal Cut Sets) which 
will fail the system if they occur together and which contain the 
common susceptibilities (Common Causes) that can fail various 
components simultaneously. The Boolean expression for the Top event 
failure thus generated can then be used to quantify the sensitivity of 
the Top event Mean frequency upon each of the Common Cause basic event 
Mean probability by defining an index that measures the sensitivity of 
the Top event upon the dependent failures as 
where 
P s mean value of the Top event probability 
e mean value of the component i failure due to common 
cause or susceptibility j (such as moisture, tempera­
ture, etc.) which also fail some other components. 
= Susceptibility Index for common cause or susceptibility 
j acting on component i. 
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The failure probability of a component can be split up into two 
components: (1) random hardware failure, and (2) common cause failure as 
follows: 
Pi = PiO + % ^ ij ji • 
where: 
p^ O = probability of random failure of component i 
f.j c when the component i does not fail due to susceptibility j 
si, when the component i fails due to susceptibility j 
(with probability e^ ) 
Now the failure probability or frequency of a Top event can be expressed 
In terms of the component probabilities as follows: 
: :  ' ' ._L 1 n 
(3) 
In equation 3, p^ ...p^  are n-component probabilities or frequencies, P 
is the Top event probability, and A, , coefficients with values 0, lot- • , •OL^ i 1 n 
1, or -1 which are characteristic of the fault tree considered. Using 
equations 2 and 3, we can obtain the Susceptibility Index of each compo­
nent 1 due to susceptibility j. 
Example 
Let us consider that the failure of a specific system is given by 
the expression 
Top = + XgXg + X^ Xg + Xg 
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where are the basic events. Let us consider that 
the susceptibilities that may cause the basic events are moisture, 
temperature» vibration, and impact. Specifically, let us consider that 
iu>ist\ire affects X^ , Xg, and X^ ; temperature affects X^ , Xg, 
and Xg: vibration affects X^ , X^ , and Xg and impacts affect 
Xj^ , Xg, and X^ . For simplicity, here we will consider that all 
equipment is in the same location so that all the applicable basic 
events are affected by a particular susceptibility. Then, we can write. 
pi ° pio * ^it * ^ 11 
where p^ g is the probability of the basic event X^  due to random 
failure, is the probability of X^  due to temperature T, and 
e^ j is the probability of X^  due to impact I. The total failure 
probability for X^  is p^ . Similar expressions can be written for 
The dependent failure Sensitivity Index can now be obtained using 
equation 1. The results for this example are provided in Table 1. A 
ranking of Dj^  can now be obtained based on the values of p.. 
The numerical values of p^ ,^ the total failure probability of 
basic event i, can be extracted from such data sources as NFRDS, IEEE 
Std 500, LER equipment summaries, WASB-1400, and plant experience. 
These data sources generally do not separate the failure rates for 
random failures and dependent failures; rather the dependent and random 
failures are combined to provide total failure rates. Therefore, the 
failure data obtained from these data sources can be considered to be 
appropriate for use in the formulations presented. 
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Table 1. Dependent failure susceptibility index for the event i 
due to susceptibility j 
Susceptibility 
Vibration Moisture Temperature Event Impact 
0 1 0 1 
N. j 
i \ T V M I 
x i  0    
*2 P3 P3 P3 0 
x 3  0  0  0  p 2  
0 P5 0 0 
X5 P4 0 P4 P4 
x g  0  1 1 0  
The method looks at one common cause failure at a time and finds 
the sensitivity of the Top event failure probability to this source. 
The mathematical formulation states that the sensitivity is simply 
dependent on two factors: (a) the structure of the fault tree, and 
(b) the total probability of the basic events or component failure 
elements. The assumption used in this formulation is that the random 
failure probability of a component is not affected by any existing 
common cause susceptibility. 
The method outlines the procedure for a preliminary analysis of 
the dependent failures in order to develop a ranking of the CCFs with 
minimal effort. An important favorable feature of the method is that 
the failure data requirements are not as demanding. In fact, in this 
model, the major data required are the total probability of individual 
failure (random failure and failure due to all the common causes that 
are being considered) of the component of interest from past 
observation. This is in contrast to the beta factor [4] or binomial 
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failure rate [5] method of dependent failure quantification where the 
assessment of the parameters has to be based on multiple failure 
observations from the industry. 
Informational Needs for Uncertainty Propagation 
Introduction 
Quantification of the probability of rare events such as failure of 
a safety system on demand, or the frequency of Core Melt due to an 
initiating event (such as Loss of Offsite Power) is associated with large 
uncertainty due to a number of reasons. These include, for example, the 
modeling uncertainty and the inadequacy of the failure history even at 
the component level. For a particular system failure model (e.g., a 
Fault Tree), the existing approaches calculate Top level uncertainty by 
propagating the uncertainties of the basic-event failure probabilities 
through the Fault Tree in one form or another, e.g., Monte-Carlo 
simulation, propagation of Moments, and propagation of Discrete 
Probability Distributions. The data analysis requirements for 
uncertainty propagation can be considered reduced by prejudging 
information needs obtained through sensitivity analysis. 
The proposed PRA approach can identify the significant issues in the 
Top event uncertainty quantification, such as: 
• How important are the uncertainties of the component 
unavailability due to random failures as compared to those of 
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the Common Cause failures? How important are the 
uncertainties of the initiating events? 
• How is the uncertainty of the frequency of the Top event 
related to the structure of the Fault Tree? Given a 
reasonably complex Fault Tree* what are the subset of the 
basic events whose uncertainties impact Top level uncertainty 
significantly? 
• If the uncertainty of the Top event is sensitive to and 
dominated by only a few components (such as some of the Common 
Cause basic events) what computational procedure will 
adequately serve the purpoe of uncertainty quantification? 
• 1f.it is found that uncertainty propagation in the massive 
scale is unnecessary, what level of effort should be invested 
in formulating and structuring the data base? 
Approach 
The sensitivity analysis approach for risk assessment as developed 
in this study furnishes the information needs for uncertainty 
propagation. Before a full scale uncertainty propagation is pursued, 
it is proposed to identify the basic events which impact the Top event 
uncertainty significantly. This can be achieved by obtaining the 
ranking of the basic events based upon the Significance Indices 
and as defined by equation 18) in Section V. 
m m  
( 2 )  
Significance index S^  gives the percentage change in the Top 
event Variance induced by a percentage change in the basic event Mean. 
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(2) 
Thus» S identifies those components where the Mean values 
m  
contribute significantly to the Top event Variance. Safety 
(3) 
Significance index S^  yields the percentage change in the Top 
event variance induced by a percentage change in the basic event 
Variance and in the process identifies those components uncertainties 
where Variances contribute significantly to the Top event Variance. 
Based on the ranking via these Significance Indices, the selection of 
the significant elements can follow in a straightforward fashion. The 
resources can then be concentrated on these major contributors in 
assessing their Mean values and Variances more accurately. The level 
of effort expended on insignificant element can be economized 
commensurately. 
The methodology additionally provides a framework to determine the 
shape- of the Top event distribution for various class of Fault Tree 
structure. For example, the uncertainty propagation for various mixes 
of AND and OR dominated Tree can be studied and generic conclusions 
derived. Such generic conclusions along with the knowledge of the 
dominant contributors to Top event uncertainty can potentially aid 
development of uncertainty propagation technique to a considerable 
extent. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Two basic approaches are explored in this dissertation to help the 
decision-maker in arriving at rational decisions pertaining to high 
technology energy systems. One approach deals with formal decision 
analysis using Multiahaibute Utility Theory (MAUT). The other approach 
uses Probabilistic Risk Assessment technology for risk management 
pertaining to high technology systems. 
The MAUT is formulated for decisions pertaining to siting of 
nuclear power plants and assessing risk from various proliferation 
routes of acquiring nuclear weapons by nonnuclear countries and 
terrorist groups. The decision models, in both the cases, produced 
results consistent with the results obtained through other qualitative 
and quantitative approaches used in the nuclear industry, thus 
validating the MAUT formulations. 
New quantitative approaches are presented to strengthen the 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment tools in predicting and reducing the risk 
associated with the high technology systems. The characteristics of 
point-estimate risk calculations are investigated. Also, an 
uncertainty propagation method based on the Discrete Propagation 
Distribution is explored as compared to the Monte Carlo method and 
Histogram method. Finally, a framework is presented to investigate the 
robustness of the PRA results based on three Significance Indices that 
denote the percentage variations of the Top event mean and variance due 
to variations induced in each of the basic events. 
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Further research is suggested* as an extension of the Significance 
Indices approach, for quantitative determinations of the Common Cause 
Failures and for informational needs for uncertainty propagation in PRA. 
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